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WHACKING, JOYRIDING AND WAR-DRIVING:
ROAMING USE OF WI-FI AND THE LAW
Benjamin D. Kernt
Nokia, the Finnish mobile phone manufacturer, has referred to
roaming Wi-Fi use as "robbing,"1 while the New York Times ethicist
says that it is fine.2 This article explores the controversial practice of
using unencrypted Wi-Fi network connections to the Internet without
the prior express approval of the network's operator. Roaming Wi-Fi
use creates value for individuals and society through its expansion of
the accessibility of high speed Internet connections outside the home
or office. However, inconsistency and lack of clarity in current law
have created uncertainty among Wi-Fi users that could threaten that
value.
Part I introduces Wi-Fi technology and its explosive growth. It
then explains that many networks are either intentionally or
unintentionally "open," allowing access to the network by a roaming
Wi-Fi user. Finally, Part I distinguishes "whackers," or wireless
hackers, from roaming Wi-Fi users. Roaming Wi-Fi users include
"joyriders" that use an open Wi-Fi connection to access the Internet,
"war-drivers," who scan, locate, and map Wi-Fi access points, and
accidental users, who unintentionally connect to a Wi-Fi network.
Part II discusses the benefits and costs associated with roaming
Wi-Fi use. Use of open Wi-Fi connections to enable access to the
Internet should be encouraged because this use will contribute to the
continued expansion, flexibility, and "footprint" of the Internet, as
t Mr. Kern is an attorney with Gordon & Glickson LLC, a Chicago-based law firm
devoted exclusively to providing strategic legal counsel to the IT marketplace. He received his
J.D. from Cornell Law School (1997), his M.B.A. from Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of
Management (1996) and his B.A. from Indiana University (1992). The author wishes to express
his appreciation to Lynn Stram for her intrepid research assistance, to Jennifer Lupfer, Amy
Alvarado and the editorial staff of the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal
for their invaluable assistance and suggestions, and to Stacey Kern for her comments,
indulgence and tireless support through many evenings and weekends.
1. James Middleton, Warchalking is theft, says Nokia, at
http://www.vnunet.com/News/I 135130 (Sept. 18, 2002).
2. Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Wi-Fi Fairness, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 8, 2004, at
22.
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well as the development of new networking technologies. Concerns
regarding the costs of this use, security risks, and liability risks do not
change this conclusion, even in the case of networks that have
inadvertently been left open.
Part III examines federal statutes, state statutes, and a common
law trespass action, all of which initially appear relevant to roaming
Wi-Fi use. While most federal statutes will not apply to roaming Wi-
Fi use, application of the laws of many states, and possibly the
Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), to roaming Wi-Fi
use depends on whether roaming Wi-Fi use is considered intentional,
unauthorized access. Examination of federal, state, and common law
decisions reveals four basic approaches to defining intentional,
unauthorized access. Most jurisdictions do not provide guidance as to
how intentional, unauthorized access is to be interpreted.
Part IV analyzes the four tests for finding intentional,
unauthorized use, and concludes that access to an open Wi-Fi network
should be considered intentional, unauthorized access only if the
network operator has taken affirmative steps to prevent access. This
approach provides clarity to Wi-Fi users, facilitates roaming use of
Wi-Fi, encourages responsible security practices, and simplifies
enforcement of unauthorized computer access statutes. This article
concludes by encouraging legislators to consider modeling their
statutes after New York's unauthorized computer access statute.
Alternatively, under statutes that do not provide clear guidance in
interpreting intent and authorization requirements, courts should
consider following decisions that find intentional, unauthorized access
only if security measures have been adopted. Finally, in cases where
statutes already dictate the application of approaches other than the
approach advocated in this article, courts should consider the context
in which roaming Wi-Fi occurs, as well as the value of facilitating
roaming Wi-Fi, in determining whether a user may assume that access
to an open network is permissible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wi-Fi3 wireless data networking technology has been a great
success story in the first few years of the twenty-first century. Wi-Fi
(short for "wireless fidelity") is a short-range networking technology
that allows computers with Wi-Fi capability to connect to computer
networks and the Internet using a radio connection rather than wires.
In most cases, Wi-Fi connections take place between a laptop
computer with a Wi-Fi card or integrated Wi-Fi capability and a radio
"access point" located within approximately 300 feet of the laptop.
Wi-Fi equipment has become very popular because it is inexpensive
and easy to use.
Use of Wi-Fi networks to access the Internet has become
widespread, with tens of millions of users accessing Wi-Fi networks
at home or in the office. According to market research firm Pyramid
Research, the number of worldwide Wi-Fi users is projected to reach
707 million by 2008.4 As of 2004, approximately 5% of all
Americans have Wi-Fi networks in their homes. 5 Enterprises also
have adopted Wi-Fi at a rapid rate, often as a supplement to, or
replacement for, existing wired networks. Users who have become
accustomed to connecting to the Internet using Wi-Fi in the home or
at the office have increasingly searched for ways to continue using
Wi-Fi access to the Internet while on the road. As the number of Wi-
Fi users has increased, demand for public Wi-Fi access points (known
as "hotspots") has grown rapidly.
A variety of entities make Wi-Fi accessible to the public,
including telecommunications carriers, municipalities, coffee shops,
hotels, airports, and others. Individuals may also often share their
home Internet access through Wi-Fi, in the spirit of cooperation, and
in the expectation that other individuals will share their networks as
3. See Wi-Fi FAQs, Wi-Fi Alliance, at
http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/FAQ.asp?TID=2#WECA (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). The
Wi-Fi Alliance, formerly known as the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance, established
the "Wi-Fi" standard for manufacturers, providing requirements and certification for
interoperability among devices that comply with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers ("IEEE") 802.11 standards. Wi-Fi certification was originally available only for
802.1 lb 2.4 GHz WLANs, but is now available for 80211 Ia 5GHz networks.
4. Pyramid Predicts 700 Million Wi-Fi Users by 2008, Pyramid Research, at
http://www.pyramidresearch.com/info/press/release_030721 .asp (July 21, 2003).
5. Jack Kapica, Consumers still hazy on Wi-Fi facts: Study, Globeandmail.com,
available at
http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040225.gtwififeb25/BNStory/Techn
ology/ (on file with the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal) (Feb. 25,
2004).
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well. Community groups have formed in New York City, San
Francisco, Seattle, Portland, Austin, and other cities to promote
sharing of Wi-Fi Internet access.
Some individuals or businesses unintentionally leave their
networks unencrypted, allowing roaming users to access the Internet
through their networks without the operator's express prior consent,
6
and often without their knowledge. Wi-Fi equipment includes a
number of security mechanisms, including encryption, that can easily
be used to prevent unknown users from connecting to an access point.
Depending on the Wi-Fi equipment vendor, the encryption feature
may or may not be turned on by default. Many consumers and
businesses do not enable these security measures, because they wish
to share access to the Internet with neighbors or the public, because
they may not appreciate the risks associated with leaving a network
unsecured, or because they appreciate the risks, but determine that the
risks are not serious enough to merit taking the additional steps
required to secure a network. Unsecured Wi-Fi networks, through
which roaming access to the Internet is possible, are referred to as
"open" networks.
This article will focus on the application of existing laws to
roaming Wi-Fi users who access the Internet through an open Wi-Fi
network without obtaining prior express permission from the
network's operator. In the colorful lexicon of wireless enthusiasts,
roaming users may include "joyriders" and "war-drivers," as well as
accidental users, and are to be distinguished from "whackers."
"Joyriders" find and use a Wi-Fi connection outside of their home or
office for a variety of purposes, including checking e-mail, web
surfing, or connecting to a corporate network. "War-drivers" use
software to scan the airwaves for "beacon frames" that are broadcast
by Wi-Fi networks or other information transmitted by a Wi-Fi access
point in response to a probe request. 7 When a network is found, a
6. See Statistics for WWWD3, at http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/ (last visited Sept.
20, 2004). In an annual event termed the "Worldwide WarDrive," participants around the globe
spend a week locating and accumulating data about access points. In 2003, participants
surveyed 88,122 access points worldwide, and determined that WEP encryption technology,
which is included on all Wi-Fi access points, was enabled in only 32.26% of these access points.
7. See Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving,
and the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2004), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue3/v9i3_a07-Ryan.pdf (discussing war dialing and war-driving).
The term "war-driving" is a play on words based on scenes from the 1983 movie WarGames, in
which the protagonist randomly dialed numerous telephone numbers to find unsecured or poorly
secured computer networks connected by modem to the phone lines. This random dialing was
later termed "wardialing." When software tools made it possible to ride in a car and scan for
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war-driver may record and publish the location of the network, as
well as certain details about the network, including information as to
whether encryption has been enabled on the network. However, for
purposes of this article, the act of war-driving does not include
joyriding or actually connecting to the network. Roaming users may
also include those who unintentionally connect to a Wi-Fi network.
The popular Microsoft Windows XP operating system software
contains a "zero configuration" feature designed to facilitate
connecting to Wi-Fi networks, which can cause a user to connect to a
network unintentionally. An "accidental user" may joyride on a
network without realizing that a connection has been made, or may
believe that he or she is connecting to his or her own home or office
network when instead he or she is connecting to a third-party's
network. This article will focus on joyriders, because most of the
laws discussed in this article require that a user engage in some type
of intentional "access." 8  War-drivers typically do not meet the
"access" requirement, and accidental use does not constitute the
"intentional" access required by most statutes. This article, however,
will point out a few existing laws that may apply to war-driving or
accidental use.
The roaming Wi-Fi users discussed in this article are to be
distinguished from "whackers," who, for purposes of drawing a bright
line in this article, will be defined as users who intentionally access a
Wi-Fi network for destructive, malicious, theft or espionage purposes.
The term "hacker" is popularly used in the media to refer to a
malicious computer or network user, although use of the term in
technology circles is considerably more nuanced.9 A "whacker" is a
hacker that uses wireless technology. Whackers would include those
random unsecured Wi-Fi networks, its proponents were quick to note the similarity to
wardialing, and thus termed their new activity "war-driving." Software used in war-driving may
be "passive," meaning that it collects only information generally broadcast by an access point,
or may use varying degrees of active probing.
8. Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1272-73 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (finding that to "access" means "to exercise the 'freedom or ability to... make use of
something," and that "when someone sends an e-mail message from his or her own computer,
and the message then is transmitted through a number of other computers until it reaches its
destination, the sender is making use of all of those computers, and is therefore 'accessing'
them." (citing MIRRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1994)). Using a Wi-
Fi network to gain Internet access is therefore likely to be considered "access" to the network.
War-drivers who passively scan for access point beacon frames likely do not "access" these
access points, although war-drivers who use more active scanning and probing methods may
arguably be deemed to engage in "access." Active scanners may be treated more like those this
article calls joyriders than like war-drivers.
9. See Ryan, supra note 7.
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who would otherwise be joyriders, but who engage in activities such
as spamming, or other independently illegal activities like sharing
copyrighted files or accessing illegal pornography. Existing laws
apply to whackers in the same way that they apply to any non-
wireless user who accesses, steals, modifies, or deletes data, or
otherwise takes actions to harm a computer or data. A detailed
discussion of laws that apply to hacking behavior is beyond the scope
of this article.
II. THE CASE FOR ROAMING Wi-FI USE
Roaming Wi-Fi use is an important evolutionary step in the
development and expansion of the exchange of information enabled
by the Internet. The value of this method of accessing the Internet
lies primarily in its enhancement of the timeliness, frequency,
convenience, and flexibility of connecting to the Internet. This value
is exponentially increased by expansion of the number and
distribution of accessible Wi-Fi networks. However, the value of
roaming Wi-Fi use must be evaluated in light of the economic costs of
this behavior, the security implications of permitting use that has not
been expressly authorized, and the idea that a network operator could
be held liable for the actions of a roaming Wi-Fi user or whacker that
accesses the Internet through the operator's network. Ideally, laws
applicable to roaming Wi-Fi use will facilitate and encourage
roaming, while deterring destructive behavior and providing remedies
to any network operator injured by a malicious or destructive user.
A. Value to Individuals and Society
The primary value of roaming Wi-Fi access lies in its expansion
of the number and type of locations from which a user can find
immediately accessible high-speed Internet access. In the last decade,
the Internet has revolutionized communication, created countless
business efficiencies and dramatically accelerated the growth of the
body of human knowledge. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"[t]he Internet is 'a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication' through which "at any given time 'tens of
thousands of users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of
subjects."'" 0 The Supreme Court further recognized that "[t]he Web
is thus comparable ... to both a vast library including millions of
10. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 852 (1997) (citing Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall
offering goods and services," and that the Internet contains content
"as diverse as human thought."" Congress has found that the Internet
offers "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity."'
' 2
Internet access experienced its most dramatic growth to date as it
expanded beyond labs and universities to homes and offices.
Wireless technologies (primarily Wi-Fi, and for limited but expanding
purposes, cellular technologies) have been the primary driving force
in the further expansion of Internet access, as they have allowed users
to move first to living rooms, kitchens, and conference rooms, and
more recently, to public areas including parks, restaurants, coffee
shops, airports, and convention centers. This expansion improves
many of the advantages that the Internet has already created, by
allowing for the more timely, frequent, and convenient exchange of
ideas and information. The expansion of Internet access into public
places facilitated by Wi-Fi also creates opportunities to use the
Internet for new and novel ways of interacting, and new applications.
Open commercial and residential Wi-Fi networks are widespread
and common in urban areas. To a business traveler, student, web log
(or "blog") author or any other person for whom the Internet is a
critical tool, the ability to access a Wi-Fi network, whether for-pay, or
shared by a commercial or residential network operator, can add
flexibility to a user's schedule, facilitate productive use of otherwise
wasted time, and provide for efficient and timely use of information.
A user that is able to find and use a Wi-Fi network may be able to
avoid the need for a trip back to the office to synchronize e-mail or
obtain driving directions. A user forced to wait in a car or in a
waiting room where open Wi-Fi signals are available might be able to
turn more downtime into productive time. A traveler on the road may
be able to obtain updated sales, projection, or pricing information in a
more timely way. The aggregate value of this access to Wi-Fi users is
difficult to quantify, but research projections anticipate that Wi-Fi
users will be prepared to spend $1.4 billion for paid roaming Wi-Fi
access in the United States by 2009.' 3
11. Id. at 852-53.
12. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(3) (West 2001).
13. Free Hotspots Restrict Revenues for Wi-Fi Service Providers, Frost & Sullivan, at
http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/press-
release.pag?docid=5115637&ctxixpLink=FcmCtx6&ctxixpLabel=FcmCtx7 (July 31, 2003).
20041
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The fact that shared Wi-Fi access may be free for a roaming user
also contributes to the importance of this method of access. One
reason for the Internet's success and for its contributions to higher
learning is that it started as a free tool for scientists, academics, and
students. Shared Wi-Fi access has great value in allowing this
tradition to continue, both in university-sponsored venues and off-
campus, as well. A student who chooses to write a paper at a coffee
shop or late-night pancake house may be able to continue research
while writing if given the ability to connect his or her laptop to the
Internet. There are also instances in which roaming use of Wi-Fi
could potentially provide high-speed access to populations that
wouldn't ordinarily be able to afford this access.
Metcalfe's law, a principle attributed to Dr. Robert Metcalfe, the
inventor of Ethernet networking technology, argues that the value of a
network increases exponentially with the addition of each additional
interconnection to the network. 14  Metcalfe's "law" is based on
Metcalfe's anecdotal observation that "[c]onnected computers are
better. Having the only telephone in the world would be of zero value,
but this value increases for each new telephone it can call."'
15
Community networking facilitated by laws favorable to roaming Wi-
Fi provides an example of exponentially increasing value. Assume
that four home Wi-Fi network operators open their networks to allow
access by each other. At a minimum, each of these users would then
have the ability to access the Internet wirelessly from four locations,
instead of one. In the aggregate, the addition of these four
operator/users would facilitate sixteen unique access possibilities.
Glenn Fleishman, a prominent journalist and blogger on Wi-Fi topics,
described an application of Metcalfe's law to Wi-Fi as follows:
Wireless networks require substantial innovation and expense in
developing the basic technology, but then each additional node has
substantially less cost associated than with increasing a wireline
network, whether in an office or across a city. Wireless reduces the
friction in accelerating the density of network, and that
rollercoaster ride into exponential power is where speed freaks get
their high. 16
14. George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP 158 (Sept. 13, 1993),
available at http://www.seas.upenn.edu/-gaj l/metgg.html.
15. Bob Metcalfe, There Oughta Be a Law, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, July 15, 1996, at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0715laws.html.
16. Glenn Fleishman, Newsweek's Focus on Wireless, Wi-Fi Networking News, at
http://wifinetnews.com/archives/2004_05.html (May 31, 2004).
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A recent California Supreme Court decision recognizes the
danger posed by restrictions that could serve to decrease free use of
the Internet. The court cited Lawrence Lessig's observation that an
online marketplace
benefits greatly from a network that is open and where access is
free. It is this general feature of the Net that makes the Net so
valuable to users and a source of great innovation. And to the
extent that individual sites begin to impose their own rules of
exclusion, the value of the network as a network declines. If
machines must negotiate before entering any individual site, then
the costs of using the network climb.
17
Wi-Fi access represents one of the latest innovations in the
expansion of the power of the Internet. Other new networking
technologies, such as mesh networking and the use of ad hoc
networks between individual computing devices facilitated by
wireless technologies, promise to continue this expansion by allowing
computing devices to instantly establish communications with a
minimum of formality and overhead. It is important to recognize that
resolution of the controversy surrounding opportunistic Wi-Fi use,
from both technological and legal perspectives, could impact the
growth of future technologies.
The Internet may prove to be the most significant factor in
enabling the growth of human knowledge since the printing press. It
has also created efficiency and expanded opportunities in countless
business and personal situations. Roaming use of Wi-Fi connections
promises to enhance the value of the Internet to many users, and may
create invaluable new opportunities. Laws must recognize and
encourage this value creation.
B. Economic Cost
A roaming Wi-Fi user obtains broadband Internet access service,
a valuable resource, without paying compensation. However, the
marginal cost of the bandwidth used by a roaming Wi-Fi user to the
business or individual operator of the Wi-Fi network is typically
negligible. Many broadband connections are offered on a flat-fee
basis for a given amount of bandwidth, which places no practical
restriction on the total amount of data that may be transferred using
the connection during a given month, but restricts the amount of data
that could be transmitted at one time. A typical broadband customer
17. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 310-11 (2003) (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 171 (2001)).
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uses only a fraction of the bandwidth allocated to the customer in a
given month. Use of a Wi-Fi network on an itinerant basis for
reasonable e-mail and web surfing consumes only a small amount of
bandwidth, and therefore should not disrupt the operator's use of his
own network in any way.
Calling roaming Wi-Fi access "free," however, does not take
into consideration the cost to the Internet service provider that makes
service available to a Wi-Fi network operator. Regardless of whether
the network operator pays a fixed cost for access, additional usage of
the Internet service could have an impact on the Internet service
provider's capacity and infrastructure usage and planning. Sharing an
Internet connection can increase the level of usage beyond what is
anticipated or economical for an Internet service provider. In
addition, it is possible that someone who discovers an accessible Wi-
Fi connection from his or her residence or business may forego
obtaining service individually, and instead rely on using his or her
neighbor's service. It is important to note, however, that roaming Wi-
Fi use typically does not provide a user with a substitute for home or
office access. T-Mobile USA, one of the largest hotspot operators in
the United States, has reported that 90% of its Wi-Fi service
subscribers have high-speed Internet access at home.'
8
For these reasons, many Internet service providers provide
service subject to terms of use or acceptable use policies that impose
rules about how a connection may be used, including restrictions on
sharing. Internet service providers have the ability to structure terms
of service to permit or prohibit sharing, as appropriate to meet their
individual economic models and experience with bandwidth usage.
Providers can also use terms of service as a way to differentiate their
services from their competitors' services. Several service providers
have taken prominent positions in this respect. Time Warner Cable
has made its prohibition of Wi-Fi connection sharing clear by sending
cease and desist letters to a number of its subscribers who had listed
their open Wi-Fi networks in a database maintained for the
NYCWireless users' group.' 9 Conversely, Speakeasy, a Seattle-based
Internet service provider, advertises that it expressly permits Wi-Fi
18. T-Mobile, Comcast team on hot-spot service (Feb. 2, 2004), RCR Wireless News, at
http://www.rcmews.com/cgi-bin/news.plnewsld=16736.
19. Letter from Gregory Powell, Abuse & Security, Supervisor, High Speed Online
Services, Time Warner Cable of NYC (June 25, 2002), available at
http://www.serebin.com/ben/wireless/TWCWirelessResponse.jpg.
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connection sharing, and in fact, supports billing of third-parties in the
event that a network operator wishes to charge for shared access.2°
Responsibility for complying with a service provider's terms of
use must lie with the network operator, who has the opportunity to
read and understand a service provider's terms of service, and to
choose a provider with terms that meet the operator's needs. A
roaming user, whether intentionally or unintentionally provided
access by a Wi-Fi network operator, will have no way to know
whether the connection sharing was permitted by the operator's
Internet service provider.
Roaming Wi-Fi access could also have an impact on the
operators of for-pay hotspots. In some cases, this impact has come in
the form of healthy competition. Some for-pay operators have begun
to offer additional valuable services to justify the additional cost of a
for-pay hotspot. For example, for-pay operators can offer more
visibility and certainty in being able to locate a hotspot. These
operators may offer a higher quality of service and user support.
Some hotspot operators offer value-added services including
streaming music or video, higher and more dependable bandwidth
levels, and security features. In many cases, however, free and for-
pay networks do not compete. For-pay hotspots are typically located
in highly-traveled areas, while shared hotspots can be located
anywhere. Part of the value in supporting the use of open Wi-Fi
networks is that open networks may permit a roaming Wi-Fi user to
get Internet access from places that have not been identified as prime
locations by commercial Wi-Fi providers.
Sharing a connection with roaming Wi-Fi users, or operating an
unsecured network that is accessible to roaming Wi-Fi users, often
will not cost the operator anything out-of-pocket, and is not likely to
noticeably reduce the operator's available bandwidth or performance.
In the event that the network operator experiences adverse effects
from sharing, the operator can easily enable encryption on its network
or otherwise control access to its network. A service provider can
protect itself by creating terms of service that appropriately reflect its
expectations regarding its customers' use of its service. The direct
economic costs of roaming Wi-Fi usage do not, therefore, present a
compelling justification for prohibiting roaming users from accessing
open Wi-Fi connections.
20. Duffy Hayes, Speakeasy not only encourages connection sharing.. .It promotes it,
About Speakeasy, at http://www.speakeasy.net/press/news/news I 11902.php.
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C. Security Concerns
Some people argue that roaming Wi-Fi use should be prohibited
because it creates security risks. Open Wi-Fi networks can, under
some circumstances, provide network access to a person who uses
that access to intercept data traveling over the network, to read, copy,
delete, or modify files in shared directories on the network, or to
engage in other whacking behavior. In one recent case, several men
pled guilty to violations of the CFAA and other statutes after
accessing credit card information stored in the computer systems of
Lowe's hardware store by accessing a store's open Wi-Fi network
from the parking lot of the store.21
Because the defendants in the Lowe's case caused damage via an
open Wi-Fi network, it may seem that an adequate solution is to
restrict roaming Wi-Fi access. However, laws prohibiting roaming
Wi-Fi access could actually undermine network security on a large
scale. Laws that purport to protect networks may give network
operators a false sense of security. A network operator who relies on
the law to protect his or her network against unwanted access may not
take reasonable or appropriate technical measures to secure the
network.
The New York legislature determined that the best approach to
encouraging network security was to impose a certain level of
responsibility on network operators. New York's statute prohibiting
unauthorized computer use provides protection only if the computer
22or network operator has implemented security measures. This
requirement was included in the statute "'in order to encourage
greater self-protection on the part of the computer industry."' 23 As a
New York court considering this provision summarized, "The
legislative history of the statute makes clear that this requirement was
included on the ground that '[s]uch protective devices provide the
21. See Bill of Indictment, United States v. Salcedo et al., (No. 5.03cr53-MCK)
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2003); Criminal Docket for Case #: 03-CR-53-ALL, available at
http://pacer.ncwd.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/pacer250.pl?puid=01094528557 (last visited Sept. 16,
2004); Entry and Acceptance of Guilty Plea (Rule 11 Proceeding), United States v. Salcedo,
(No. 5:03cr53-McK) (W.D.N.C. June 4, 2004);'Entry and Acceptance of Guilty Plea (Rule II
Proceeding), United States v. Botbyl, (No. 5:03cr5 I-V) (W.D.N.C. June 7, 2004).
22. See generally, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999).
23. People v. Angeles, 687 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999) (citing WILLIAM C.
DONNINO, MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK Book 39 at 284, PRACTICE
COMMENTARY TO PENAL LAW ARTICLE 156 (1999)).
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first line of defense against unauthorized intrusion into a computer
system.'
24
An operator that desires to prevent roaming users from accessing
the Internet through its network can easily turn on encryption, which
would prevent such access, or can implement alternative methods of
security that would allow access to some, but not all, of the operator's
network. All access points that bear Wi-Fi certification are capable of
supporting a basic encryption method called WEP ("Wired Equivalent
Privacy") with a few keystrokes. Although WEP has proven
vulnerable, the use of WEP still provides protection against all but
serious attackers, and clearly indicates to prospective users that access
is to be prohibited. Successors to WEP, such as WPA ("Wi-Fi
Protected Access"), and a new standard called 802.11 i, provide
improved security measures. An operator may alternatively leave
portions of his or her network open and instead implement measures
to secure sensitive data using virtual local area networks ("VLANs"),
firewalls, or other security devices.
Several areas of law, in addition to New York's unauthorized
computer use statute, promote responsible security practices by
providing protection only when a user has taken security measures.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, for example, requires that a user have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in materials in order for those materials to be
protected. Another example of a statutory approach that requires a
user to take steps for his or her own protection is found in the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which provides protection only for
information that "is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.,
25
Expecting network operators to configure their networks with an
appropriate level of security does not place an unreasonable
additional burden on these operators. Most Wi-Fi network operators
also have broadband connections to the Internet. Broadband
connections, like Wi-Fi networks, may open a network to access by
others, and require that a user take some level of security measures to
protect sensitive data on the network. In fact, in the context of
applying the Fourth Amendment, one court held that a computer user
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
contained on a computer that is connected to a shared broadband
24. Id. (citing Mem. of the Att'y Gen., 1986 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 232, 233 (supporting
L.1986, ch. 514).
25. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4)(ii)(1985).
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network, and on which file and print sharing are enabled. 26 A Wi-Fi
network operator will typically either already have implemented
security measures on the network, and will be familiar with basic
security concepts prior to adding Wi-Fi access to the network, or will
have a network that already allows a certain amount of access to data.
In the latter case, an open Wi-Fi network would provide an additional
means of accessing such data, but would not make otherwise secure
data insecure. A law that prohibits access to open networks will be
far less effective in improving security than a law that encourages a
network operator to adopt security practices appropriate for protecting
its sensitive data.
A recent law review article entitled War, Peace, or Stalemate:
Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and the Emerging Market for
Hacker Ethics additionally suggests that war-driving, like other forms
of "ethical" hacking, can be used as a tool for improving network
security.27 By finding and publishing lists of open access points, a
war-driver may alert the operator of a network to vulnerabilities that
were not intended, and had not previously been appreciated.
D. Liability Risks
Another justification for preventing roaming Wi-Fi use is the
possibility that a network operator might face liability for the
unlawful acts of a third-party that accesses the Internet through the
operator's network. This justification is largely without merit because
Internet-related legislation has clarified that those who provide access
to the Internet to third-parties are not liable for the acts of these third-
parties.
Time Warner Cable, in a letter sent to subscribers of its high-
speed Road Runner service who shared the service using Wi-Fi,
stated, "Individuals using the Road Runner system in this manner to
carry out criminal activity, would be able to do so in an anonymous
manner. In such circumstances, when law enforcement attempted to
trace such activity, the trail would end with your account., 28  The
media has reported instances in which Wi-Fi networks were used to
access or distribute illegal materials over the Internet. A Wi-Fi
network operated by an AT&T Wireless subscriber was reportedly
26. U.S. v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
27. See Ryan, supra note 7.
28. Gregory Powell, Abuse & Security, Supervisor, High Speed Online Services, Time
Warner Cable of NYC (June 25, 2002), available at
http://www.serebin.com/ben/wireless/TWC-WirelessResponsejpg.
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used by a neighbor of the subscriber to distribute an illegally copied
version of a movie. 29 In Canada, a man was arrested for allegedly
accessing child pornography from his car, using a Wi-Fi network
from a nearby house.30 A "war spammer" reportedly reached a deal
with Federal prosecutors to plead guilty to violations of the Federal
CAN-SPAM Act after allegedly sending large volumes of commercial
e-mail through open Wi-Fi access points.3'
That open Wi-Fi access points have been used in connection
with the commission of crimes is unfortunate, but warrants neither a
restriction on use of open connections nor the imposition of liability
on a network operator who leaves a connection open. Like the
Internet, roaming use of Wi-Fi expands the ways in which
information may be used and distributed, and creates new
opportunities for criminal behavior and anonymity. A North Dakota
District Court summed up the argument as follows:
On the one hand, the ability of individual users to log onto the
Internet anonymously, undeterred by traditional social and legal
restraints, tends to promote the kind of unrestrained, robust
communication that many people view as the Internet's most
important contribution to society. On the other hand, the ability of
members of the public to link an individual's online identity to his
or her physical self is essential to preventing the Internet's
exchange of ideas from causing harm in the real world. The
legislative resolution of these issues will, indirectly, shape the
content of communication over the Internet. For now, the [sic]
§230 of the Communication Decency Act errs on the side of robust
communication .... 32
Use of Wi-Fi connections for criminal purposes, like use of the
Internet for such purposes, should be addressed by targeting the
underlying criminal behavior, rather than by restricting the otherwise
valuable means by which the crime was accomplished.
Legislators have recognized that entities providing access to the
Internet should not be liable for the crimes committed through such
29. Ben Chamy, Wi-Fi users warned of pirates, CNET News, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1033_3-947496.html (July 31, 2002).
30. Richard Shim, Wi-Fi arrest highlights security dangers, CNET News, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1039-5112000.html (Nov. 28, 2003).
31. See Kevin Poulsen, Plea deal in 'war spamming' prosecution, SecurityFocus,
available at http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9453 (Sept. 3, 2004).
32. PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (D.S.D. 2001)
(citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 14-17, 24-29 (Basic
Books (2000)).
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access. The types of behavior most often identified as creating
potential liability are transmission of copyrighted materials,
transmission or receipt of pornography, and spamming. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 33 and Communications
Decency Act ("CDA")34 both include safe harbors that clarify that
Internet service providers are not liable for content transmitted
through their services, potentially including all of the types of content
referred to above. While the DMCA has certain requirements that
typically will not be met by operators of open networks, pre-DMCA
case law makes clear that network operators that do not have
knowledge of the content passing through their networks have little
danger of being liable for copyright infringement. The Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003
("CAN-SPAM") 35 clarifies that liability for spain sent by a user of an
open Wi-Fi network would rest with the user, not the network
operator.
The DMCA3 6 provides that an entity offering connections for
digital online communications will not be liable for copyright
infringement damages with respect to materials transmitted through
the network, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. These
conditions include that: (i) the transmission of the material is initiated
at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (ii) the
transmission is carried out through an automatic technical process
without selection of the material by the service provider; (iii) the
service provider does not select the recipients of the material; (iv) no
copy of the material is maintained on its system or network; and (v)
the material is transmitted without modification of its contents. 37 This
safe harbor is available, however, only if the service provider adopts
policies that provide for termination of service to repeat infringers and
informs subscribers and account holders of such policies. 38 Section
512(1) clarifies that a failure to comply with this safe harbor does not
adversely affect any other defense a service provider may have to
liability for copyright infringement.39
Even without the safe harbor, it is unlikely that an operator of an
open Wi-Fi network could be held liable for direct, contributory, or
33. 17 U.S.C.S. § 512 (West Supp. 2004).
34. 47 U.S.C.S. §§ 201 et seq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
35. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7701 etseq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 2004).
37. Id. § 512(a).
38. d. § 512(i).
39. Id. § 512(1).
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vicarious copyright infringement. Direct infringement requires that a
person actually engage in the conduct causing infringement.40
Contributory infringement requires that a network operator have
knowledge that infringing materials are being transmitted, and that the
operator induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringing
conduct.4' Vicarious liability would require that a network operator
have the ability to supervise the infringing activity and have a
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.42
Because the operator of an open Wi-Fi network would generally
have no knowledge of what materials are transmitted over the
network, and no participation in the behavior of users of its network
or opportunity to supervise such behavior, the operator will likely not
face liability for copyright infringement.
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA43 provides that "[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." This section has been broadly
interpreted to prevent a service provider from being liable for a range
of non-intellectual property-related state law claims, including
negligence, defamation, interference with prospective business
relationships, obscenity and child pornography, waste of public funds,
nuisance, premises liability, and unfair business practices. 44 If an
operator of an open network constitutes a provider of an "interactive
computer service," which expressly includes a service or system that
provides access to the Internet,45 then the operator presumably is
immune to a broad range of claims (other than intellectual property
claims) based on the actions of the users of its network.
40. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
41. Id.; Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
42. CoStar Group, Inc., 373 F.3d at 550; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
43. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (West 2001).
44. See e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein and Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984
(10th Cir. 2000) (barring state law claims for negligence and defamation); Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (regarding defamation); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's,
Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001) (barring state law claims for defamation,
negligence and interference with prospective business relationships); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992
F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (barring claims for negligence and defamation); Kathleen R. v. City
of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 775-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (wasting of public funds,
nuisance and premises liability); Stoner v. eBay Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 2000) (discussing unfair business practices); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc. 718 So. 2d 385, 389
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (regarding negligence, obscenity and child pornography).
45. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(0(2) (West 2001).
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A recent California state court decision, Grace v. eBay, Inc.,
interpreted the immunity provided by the CDA narrowly, in conflict
with decisions of the Fourth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.46 The
California court held that the CDA immunity protects those
traditionally classified as "publishers" because of their editorial
involvement in making materials available, but it does not protect
"distributors" who merely forward materials, in the event that the
distributor becomes aware that it is distributing injurious content.
The Grace case suggests that an operator could potentially face
liability if the operator is notified of the transmission of injurious
content through its network, but does not take measures to block
future access by the party transmitting such material. Similarly,
Stoner v. eBay, Inc., a case in which eBay was notified that illegally
copied audio materials were being distributed on its marketplace, but
failed to prevent such material from being distributed, suggests that
an operator may face liability for infringing content transmitted
through its network, if it has knowledge of such content.47  The
California Superior Court's opinion in Stoner stated that:
There is, to be sure, some point at which the existing immunity
would no longer apply. Although the limits of the immunity have
not yet been clearly defined, any limitation placed on the immunity
presumably would begin at the point at which providing otherwise
lawful goods or services with knowledge that they are being put to
an illegal use becomes the commission, or the aiding and abetting,
of a crime. Criminal liability in such circumstances normally
requires the intent to further or facilitate the crime.
48
The Federal CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 49 which supersedes state
spam legislation, creates liability for the transmission of unsolicited
commercial e-mail. Among other things, CAN-SPAM prohibits the
knowing and intentional initiation of multiple e-mail messages from a
computer or network that has been accessed without authorization, °
the knowing relay or retransmission of multiple e-mail messages with
46. Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 198-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). But see Ben
Ezra, Weinstein and Co., Inc., 206 F.3d 980; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp.
at 52-53.
47. 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000)
48. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Beeman,
674 P.2d 1318, 1325 (1984); Stoner, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (citing People v. Lauria, 59
Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
49. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701-13 (West Supp. 2004).
50. Id. § 7704(a)(2).
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the intent to deceive others as to the origin of such messages,5 and
the knowing relay or retransmission of various types of fraudulent e-
52
mail from a computer that has been accessed without authorization.
Initiation is expressly defined to exclude "transmission, routing,
relaying, handling, or storing, through an automatic technical process,
of an electronic mail message for which another person has identified
the recipients or provided the recipient addresses. '53 While it appears
that a user of an open network could be held responsible for sending
sparn under this Act, a network operator will neither initiate the
transmission of messages nor knowingly forward spam. Federal
prosecutors recently reached a plea bargain with a spammer who
allegedly used open networks to distribute spain in violation of CAN-
SPAM.5"
Whether or not the CDA, DMCA, and CAN-SPAM Acts
expressly apply to all materials that may be transmitted through an
open Wi-Fi network, courts have recognized that Congressional intent
to absolve service providers has been very broad. As the Fourth
Circuit observed:
Congress made a policy choice... not to deter harmful online
speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially
injurious messages .... Section 230 was enacted, in part, to
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and,
accordingl', to keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum.
III. APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAW
An e-mail distributed in July of 2002, and attributed to an FBI
Special Agent stated that:
Identifying the presence of a wireless network may not be a
criminal violation, however, there may be criminal violations if the
network is actually accessed including theft of services,
interception of communications, misuse of computing resources,
up to and including violations of the Federal Computer Fraud and
51. Id. § 7704(a)(1).
52. Id. § 7704(b)(3).
53. Id. § 7702(9),(15).
54. See Poulsen, supra note 31.
55. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Abuse Statute, Theft of Trade Secrets, and other federal
violations.
56
This e-mail differentiates between war-driving and other types of
roaming Wi-Fi use, but does not distinguish between using a
connection solely for Internet connectivity and using a connection to
gain access to data. This statement will likely have a chilling effect
on users' willingness to use open Wi-Fi networks to obtain an Internet
connection, including networks that are intentionally shared.
This article has argued that the law should continue to encourage
the development and expansion of the Internet and the general
accessibility of the Internet from new venues that will enhance the
Internet's value to users. The utility of roaming Wi-Fi to users and
the value of encouraging expansion of the Internet's accessibility,
even when considered in light of the economic cost of this access,
security concerns, and potential liability of network operators, suggest
that the law should not unreasonably restrict the use of open Wi-Fi
networks or contain ambiguity that would deter users from using
these networks. This section of the article will explore the treatment
of roaming Wi-Fi use under federal and state statutes and the common
law. While many of these laws do not appear to apply to roaming
Wi-Fi use, some statutes may apply, depending on whether such use
is considered intentional, unauthorized use. This section identifies
four approaches courts and legislators have taken to determining
whether use is intentional and unauthorized, and applies each of these
tests to roaming Wi-Fi use.
A. Federal Law
1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA") 57
prohibits unauthorized access to a computer or network in a number
of specific situations. In order to violate the most widely applicable
provisions of the CFAA, a user must intentionally access a network
without authorization, and must either obtain information or cause
damage and a loss exceeding a threshold amount. This section will
examine several approaches to determining whether a user has
intentionally accessed a network without authorization. This section
concludes that it is possible that a joyrider could be considered to
56. E-mail from Bill Shore, Special Agent, FBI (July 8, 2002), available at
http://www.stumbler.net/fbi.php.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
[Vol. 21
WHACKING, JOYRIDING AND WAR-DRIVING 121
intentionally access a network without authorization under some tests
used by courts. While it is possible that a court could hold that a user
met the other requirements of the CFAA-that the user obtain
information or cause damages and $5,000 of loss-this result is
unlikely.
The CFAA is a wide-ranging statute that contains prohibitions
on specific types of computer access, including access that threatens
national security, 58 furthers fraud or extortion, 59 compromises
financial records, or transmits computer viruses or other destructive
code.60 Most of these types of prohibited access are targeted squarely
at the activities of hackers and whackers.
The CFAA does, however, contain more broadly-applicable
provisions. Among other things, the CFAA prohibits intentional,
unauthorized access to a computer or network, where the person
accessing the computer obtains information or causes damage. This
article will discuss Sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(5)(A) of the
CFAA. Section 1030(a)(2) applies to anyone who:
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains-. . . (C)
information from any protected computer if the conduct involved
an interstate or foreign communication .... 61
Section 1030(a)(5) imposes penalties on anyone who:
(5)(A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct,
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected
computer;
(ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes
damage; or
(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and
(B) ... caused ... (i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
period ... aggregating at least $5,000 in value .... 62
58. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
59. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
60. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
61. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004). Subsections 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) and
(iii) appear redundant, in that any activity that violates clause (ii) would necessarily violate
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The application of the CFAA to roaming Wi-Fi users requires a
more detailed analysis of the following factors: (i) whether the user's
conduct involved intentional, unauthorized access; (ii) whether the
person obtained information from a protected computer; and (iii)
whether the person's conduct caused damage and a loss exceeding a
$5,000 threshold. The generally-applicable portions of the CFAA
require intentional access to a "protected computer," which would
appear to include any computer (and its associated network)
63
connected to the Internet. Before examining these requirements in
detail, it is helpful to consider the background assumptions and
context underlying the concept of authorization.
a. Distinguishing Between Authorized and
Unauthorized Access
Determining whether a user has engaged in intentional,
unauthorized access is critical to an analysis of whether a roaming
Wi-Fi user is likely to face liability under the CFAA, many state laws,
and the common law tort of trespass to chattels. For purposes of this
inquiry, it is helpful to examine both the CFAA and the common law,
as courts have looked to common law principles in determining
whether access should be considered authorized under the CFAA.64
Before the Internet and wireless networking technologies
became widely-used means of transmitting data, networks were
generally private. Someone accessing a network or computer
typically had to gain physical access to network components by
entering a facility and using an on-premises computer, or by tapping a
network cable. 65 Remote access to private networks usually had to be
clause (iii). These sections are separated in the statute because more stringent penalties apply to
clause (ii), which requires a "reckless" state of mind.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2000 & Supp. 2004) which defines a "protected computer"
as a computer "used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication"; see also A. HUGH
SCOTT, COMPUTER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 90 (BNA
2001) ("This broad definition of protected computer combined with the ever-expanding use of
the Internet has brought a considerable number of computers, including home computers with
online access, within the CFAA's reach. Although no court has interpreted this language, it
appears that connecting a computer to the Internet would make the computer one used 'in
interstate or foreign communications."').
64. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982-86 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing
common law trespass principles in holding that a user's access was unauthorized under the
Stored Communications Act and under CFAA). But see In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d
1359, 1370-71 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("[T]he 'cluster of ideas' associated with common law
'trespass' cannot be imported into CFAA.").
65. See N. Tex. Preventive Imaging, L.L.C. v. Eisenberg, No. SA CV 96-71AHS(EXX),
1996 WL 1359212, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1996) ("Thus while the pre-1994 CFAA was
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enabled by a technical professional and required a login mechanism
or password. The lines between authorized and unauthorized access
were fairly clear, except with respect to service providers and former
* 66
service providers who exceeded authorized access, or with users
who obtained authorization to access through fraudulent means.67 In
enacting the CFAA, Congress distinguished between access by
"outsiders" or "outside hackers" and by "insiders," as a proxy for
determining which users were unauthorized and which were
authorized.68  This straightforward distinction reflects the physical
nature of pre-Internet and pre-wireless networking. It becomes
confusing, however, when applied to public networks. Courts have
attempted to apply the insider/outsider distinction to website access.69
Courts have alternately shown some confusion as to this approach, 0
or acknowledged that amendments to the statute may have implicitly
made this approach obsolete.71
Publicly accessible networks, which were not common or widely
used when the CFAA was enacted in 1986, have become prominent
with the rise of the Internet. Most recent cases dealing with allegedly
unauthorized access to Internet websites have recognized that access
to publicly-accessible areas of the Internet can be considered
directed towards the unauthorized 'access' of a computer system, presumably by modem or by
direct keyboard entry, the post-1994 CFAA is directed towards a broader range of conduct by
which a person knowingly 'causes' the 'transmission' of a program, information, code, or
command to a computer.").
66. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62(1st Cir. 2003); Pac.
Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (E.D. Wash. 2003); Shurgard
Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
67. See In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
68. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996).
69. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273 (N.D. Iowa
2000) ("Similarly, is the member converted from an 'insider' to an 'outsider' for purposes of the
CFAA by violating AOL's policies? On the other hand, if AOL members are 'outsiders,' then
why would AOL's membership policies apply to them at all?").
70. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 ("The defendant also
maintains the CFAA is limited to 'outsiders' or 'hackers,' and not 'insiders' (employees).
Though the original scope of the CFAA was limited to the concerns addressed by the defendant,
its subsequent amendments have broadened the scope sufficiently to cover the behavior alleged
in this case.").
71. See id.; Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273 (N.D.
Iowa 2000), ("Similarly, is the member converted from an 'insider' to an 'outsider' for
purposes of the CFAA by violating AOL's policies? On the other hand, if AOL members are
'outsiders,' then why would AOL's membership policies apply to them at all?").
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unauthorized only if the website's terms of use expressly prohibit the
type of access the website operator finds objectionable.7
As a consequence of the inaccessibility of traditional networks to
"outsiders," one might presume that access by someone without a pre-
existing relationship with a network operator would be considered
unauthorized unless authorization or consent are affirmatively given.
By contrast, courts considering access to websites have implicitly
assumed that access is authorized unless expressly prohibited. Access
to Wi-Fi networks does not fit squarely within either the traditional
network model or the website model. Like a website, an open Wi-Fi
network can be easily accessed. However, Wi-Fi networks perform
some private functions, comparable to the function of a private, wired
network, as well as public functions.
Wi-Fi access to the Internet is provided by thousands of
individuals, businesses, and governmental bodies without direct
compensation. 73  Grass-roots organizations like NYCWireless and
Personal Telco (in Portland, Oregon) provide information and
resources to individuals who choose to share their own Internet
connections using Wi-Fi, with the expectation that they will be able to
use networks provided by others when out of their homes or offices.
Some coffee shops, restaurants, airports, convention centers, and
other venues offer free Wi-Fi access as an amenity or as a means to
attract visitors or encourage visitors to stay longer. Cities and other
governmental bodies make Wi-Fi Internet access available in public
places as a service to their constituents.
Public statements regarding the permissibility of access to open
Wi-Fi networks have been mixed. A number of prominent groups
have issued public warnings intended to encourage adoption of
security practices. Some have intended to discourage joyriding,
including the FBI agent quoted above, and Nokia, in characterizing
joyriding as "bandwidth robbing."'74  Many groups, primarily
companies in the telecommunications business for whom readily
accessible free networks represent a threat, have also tried to
discourage use of open networks. The New York Times' ethicist
72. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2004); EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (lst Cir. 2003); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100
F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1015, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
73. The Wireless Node Database Project, which maintains a publicly-available database
of network operators, expressly allows free access to their network comprising 10,072 nodes as
of September 23, 2004. See www.nodedb.com/unitedstates/?.
74. Middleton, supra note 1.
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characterized these efforts as the "natural reaction of some
institutions.., to clamp down," but continued, "[b]ut that does not
create a moral imperative to defer to those who do. Rather, you may
use but not overuse Wi-Fi hot spots you encounter., 75 Assuming that
these opposing views provide a fair reflection of the inconsistency in
general public perception, a user could reasonably believe that a
network operator who leaves its network open intends or expects that
roaming users may use the network to access the Internet. At the
same time, some roaming users may justifiably be concerned that
federal or state laws could criminalize such access.
Because access to Wi-Fi networks falls into an area that does not
have obvious parallels under existing law, and because general
perceptions as to the permissibility of accessing open Wi-Fi networks
are mixed, there is considerable ambiguity as to what constitutes
"unauthorized" access to an open Wi-Fi network. An expectation that
access to a network is unauthorized only if security measures have
been enabled is reasonable. At the same time, ambiguity as to the
permissibility and legality of accessing an open network has a chilling
effect that may prevent users from accessing intentionally shared
networks.
b. The CFAA 's Intent Requirement
The CFAA requires a "wrongful intent" in accessing a network
for a user to be convicted under the statute.76 Courts interpreting the
statute assess the culpability of the person accessing a computer or
network by determining whether the user had the requisite intent or
mental state, often characterized as mens rea or scienter.
In order to fall within the purview of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i) of
the CFAA, a user must intend to cause damage. In addition, this
subsection was amended in 2001 by the USA Patriot Act to require
that a user cause a loss of more than $5,000. 77 This section will not
apply to roaming Wi-Fi users, who access a network with the intent to
use an Internet connection, but without the intent to cause damage to
the operator of the network.
Under subsections (a)(2)(C) and (a)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the
CFAA, unauthorized access to a network must be intentional, but
75. Cohen, supra note 2.
76. U.S. v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814(d)(8), (1 1)(a)(i), 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(115 Stat. 383-84).
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intent to cause damage is not required.78 Subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii)
requires that the user "recklessly" cause damage, while (5)(A)(iii)
imposes strict liability, with no mens rea requirement with respect to
the damage requirement. Subsection (a)(2)(C) does not require that
the user cause damage. The language in the statute requiring a user to
"intentionally" access a network replaced language that had earlier
required a user to "knowingly" access a network, as a means of
ensuring that the statute was triggered only by "intentional acts of
unauthorized access-rather than mistaken, inadvertent or careless
ones."
79
Subsections (a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(A)(ii) and (a)(5)(A)(iii) each
require intentional access without authorization (or in the case of
(a)(2)(C), exceeding authorization). Implicit in the requirement that a
user access a network without authorization, is a scienter requirement
with respect to the unauthorized nature of the user's access. In other
words, if a user has no way of knowing that access is unauthorized,
the user cannot be deemed to have intentionally engaged in
unauthorized access. In U.S. v. Morris, the Second Circuit provides
support for this position, in holding that an "intentionally" scienter
requirement applied to the phrase "accesses a Federal interest
computer without authorization," but that this scienter requirement
did not apply to later language in the statute. 80 The court's reference
to the entire "accesses phrase," as opposed to simply the word
"accesses" suggests that the court recognized a scienter element with
respect to the "without authorization" requirement. Prior to the
amendment of the CFAA in 2001, courts devoted a good deal of
consideration to whether the pre-amendment "intentionally" language
applied to the damage element of the statute. However, courts have
not given the same consideration to the CFAA's implicit scienter
requirement with respect to the unauthorized nature of a user's access.
This is likely because the question of whether a user has authorization
to access traditional networks and websites can generally be answered
by a user. By contrast, the ambiguity and inconsistency in existing
law and the variety of public perceptions regarding roaming Wi-Fi
use creates uncertainty among users as to whether access to an open
network should be considered unauthorized.
78. See generally Sablan, 92 F.3d at 868; U.S. v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509 (2nd Cir.
1991); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa
2001); In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
79. S. REP. No. 99-432, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2483.
80. Morris, 928 F.2d at 507(2d Cir. 1991); see also Sablan, 92 F.3d at 868.
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Application of this implicit scienter requirement could determine
whether a user intentionally accessed a network without
authorization. The next section of this article, which considers the
"without authorization" requirement in more detail, will show that the
implicit scienter requirement favors a test to determine authorization
that requires an express indication that access is not authorized. As
will be discussed below, this scienter requirement is made explicit in
some state statutes and in some common law decisions.
c. Access Without Authorization Under the CFAA
Courts have applied several different tests to determine whether
access is "without authorization" for purposes of the requirement of
subsections (a)(2)(C), and (a)(5)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the CFAA. This
section of the article will examine several relevant reported decisions
that form the basis for this article's observation that at least four
approaches have been suggested by courts or legislators in
determining whether access is unauthorized.
The Second Circuit, in Morris, a case relating to the first
computer virus, found access to be "without authorization" when
Morris transmitted a virus that exploited bugs in features on third-
party computers and networks. The court held that Morris' access
was unauthorized because he used certain software features of the
third-party computers in a way that was not "in any way related to
their intended function."
81
This test could be applied in several different ways to Wi-Fi use.
An individual may purchase an access point with the intent to use the
access point to surf the Internet and print documents over the user's
network without wired connections. Another individual, however,
might buy an access point with the idea that the user will both use the
access point for his or her personal use, and will use it to provide
access to his or her community, as part of a community network. The
first network operator could reasonably argue that the intended
purpose of the device he or she purchased was to enable flexibility
and mobility on the user's network. The second operator's personal
use of the access point and connection sharing are also within the
intended purpose of the device. When applied to Wi-Fi, therefore, a
test that looks at the intended purpose of an access point must rely on
the subjective intent of the network operator.
81. Morris, 928 F.2d at 510.
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The First Circuit, in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.,
considered whether software that collects information from websites
did so "without authorization."82 The First Circuit held that a website
operator would need to show an express or implied prohibition on
authorization in order to support an action under the CFAA. As an
example of an implied prohibition on authorization, the court referred
to password protection, which "limits authorization by implication
(and technology), even without express terms. ' 3 The First Circuit
rejected a test applied by the District Court that held conduct to be
without authorization only if it is not "'in line with the reasonable
expectations' of the website owner and its users," but stated that a
reasonable expectations test might be useful "in other contexts where
there may be a common understanding underpinning the notion.,
84
d Four Tests for Finding Intentional Unauthorized
Access
The legislative history of the CFAA, Morris, and EF Cultural
Travel illustrate four tests that may be used to determine whether a
user has intentionally accessed a network without authorization: (i) a
test that presumes access by any "outsider," as contemplated by the
legislative history of the CFAA, to be unauthorized, absent express
authorization; (ii) a subjective test that looks at the intent of the
network operator to determine whether access is unauthorized; (iii) a
more objective test that looks at the reasonable expectations of the
network operator to determine whether access was unauthorized, or at
the reasonable expectations of a user to determine intent; and (iv) an
objective test that looks at the network operator's actions to determine
whether the operator expressed or implied prohibition on access,
which prohibition would conclusively show that access was
unauthorized. For purposes of this article, we will refer to the four
tests identified in this paragraph as, respectively, the "express
authorization test," the "subjective expectations test," the "reasonable
expectations test," and the "express prohibition test."
The express authorization test reflects Congress' statements in
enacting the CFAA, to the effect that portions of the CFAA that apply
to "unauthorized" access apply to "outsiders," while portions of the
CFAA that apply to "exceeding authorized access" (such as Section
82. 318 F.3d 58 (tst Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 62-63.
84. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001); EF
Cultural TravelBV, 318 F.3d at 63.
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1030(a)(2)(C)) apply to "insiders." Anyone who is not an "insider"-
meaning anyone who does not have a prior relationship with the
network operator-would be presumed "unauthorized" under this test.
At least one court has used the outsider/insider distinction as a factor
in determining whether access was unauthorized, while others have
refused to strictly follow the insider/outsider delineation because this
delineation does not appear in the statute itself.85  Colorado's
Computer Crime statute, discussed below, presents another example
of an application of the express authorization test.
The subjective expectations test is derived from the Morris
court's determination that access was unauthorized if the computer
accessed was used in a way that is not in any way related to its
"intended function." Ultimately, the "intended function" of a Wi-Fi
access point depends on the network operator's subjective intent in
adding the access point to the network. A court applying the
subjective expectations test could find that a roaming Wi-Fi user's
access was unauthorized because the operator of a network did not
intend to grant Internet access through its network to a roaming user.
As discussed above, the prohibition of Section 1030(A)(v)(ii) and (iii)
contains an implicit scienter requirement with respect to the
unauthorized nature of the user's access. Depending on how this
requirement was applied, a user could potentially become subject to
prosecution even if the user did not actually know (but, according to a
court, constructively knew or should have known) that access was
unauthorized.
The reasonable expectations test is a shorthand way of referring
to two separate but closely-related concepts. The first concept,
applied by the District Court and rejected by the appellate court in EF
Cultural Travel, examines the reasonable expectations of a network
operator in determining whether access is unauthorized. This test is
presumably like the subjective expectations test, but would not
consider an operator's subjective expectations dispositive as to
whether access was unauthorized if such expectations were
unreasonable.86 The second concept, implicit in the CFAA and
85. See In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (determining
that "§§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C) are intended to apply to outsiders who access a computer"). But
see Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (refusing to use the insider/outsider distinction in determining whether
CFAA should apply).
86. EF Cultural Travel BV, 318 F.3d at 62-63. The Fourth Amendment applies a test
similar to the "reasonable expectations" test, in protecting communications in which a speaker
has a "reasonable expectation of privacy". The Supreme Court has stated that this test has two
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explicit under many state statutes and common, law decisions,
examines the reasonable expectations of a user in determining
whether the user intends to engage in unauthorized access.
The reasonable expectations test was rejected by the EF Cultural
Travel appellate court as "highly imprecise, [and] litigation-
spawning," in the absence of a "common understanding underpinning
the notion" of what is reasonable in a given context.87 The reason for
the First Circuit's rejection of the reasonable expectations test applies
equally when trying to determine whether an operator's expectations
as to restricting access are reasonable and when trying to determine
whether a user's expectations as to the permissibility of access are
reasonable. The controversy surrounding roaming use of Wi-Fi
demonstrates that there is no common understanding among users of
open networks, prospective users of open networks, operators who
intentionally share access, and operators who inadvertently leave their
networks open.
The express prohibition test, applied by the EF Cultural Travel
court, as well as by courts considering whether access to websites is
unauthorized for purposes of trespass to chattels claims, implicitly
recognizes the open nature of Internet websites, and prohibits access
only if a network operator has indicated that access is prohibited, in
website terms of use, by enabling password protection or otherwise. 88
The express prohibition test would provide a clear delineation of
authorized versus unauthorized access by roaming Wi-Fi users. A
network operator can clearly indicate that his network is not to be
accessed by implementing WEP, WPA, 802.11 i, or other common
Wi-Fi security measures.
components. The speaker must establish 1) that he held "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy," and 2) that this expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. EF Cultural Travel BV, 318 F.3d at 63 (discussing the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable expectations test, addressed in Parts II.C and IlI.A.2.(b) of this article, as an example
of a context where such a common understanding might be found).
88. See also Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc. 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (N.D.
Tex. 2004) (holding that access was unauthorized under CFAA because Southwest posted terms
of use and expressly communicated to Farechase that use of "scrapers" was unauthorized.);
I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alleging that defendant obtained a username and password issued to a third-
party). But see Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1981, 1987
(E.D. Va. 2003) (calling an argument that a website without posted terms of use was open for
any purpose "an extravagant assertion" that "appears to circumvent the spirit of the CFAA, and
any other type of statute designed to protect website owners against computer hackers").
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e. Obtaining Information
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) requires that a user obtain information.
One commentator, a former leader of the Justice Department's
computer crime unit, has suggested that a roaming Wi-Fi user could
face prosecution under Section 1030(a)(2)(C) because a roaming user
accesses data packets containing routing and IP addressing
information, which could be considered "information" for purposes of
the statute.89 While the language of the statute could support this
argument, this reading would be at odds with the intent of the statute.
The legislative history of Section 1030(a)(2) indicates that "the
premise of this subsection is privacy protection." 90  Analyzing the
impact of a roaming Wi-Fi user's behavior on the privacy of the
network operator requires an examination of whether the nature of the
information accessed has an impact on the operator's desire for
privacy, and on whether roaming Wi-Fi use compromises this
privacy.
The right to privacy has been summarized by the Supreme Court
as a person's "right to be let alone by other people," a right which is
separate and distinct from the right to protection of property. 9
Privacy protection is primarily concerned with protecting information
which, if discovered by a third-party, could be used to contact,
embarrass, or harass the person to whom the information relates. It is
not concerned with preventing someone else's temporary use of the
owner's property.
The routing and IP addressing information used by a roaming
Wi-Fi user is technical information that is useful for the specific
purpose of allowing the transmission and receipt of other information.
When a roaming Wi-Fi user's computer connects to an open network,
the computer requests the temporary assignment of an address that is
internal to the accessed network. The computer also requests
information about where to send information to have it routed through
the Internet (a "gateway" address), and information obtained from a
domain name server that is used to translate human-friendly Internet
addresses into the numerical IP addresses understood by the Internet's
infrastructure ("DNS" information). Unlike an external IP address,
89. Mark D. Rasch, WiFi High Crimes, SecurityFocus, at
http://www.securityfocus.com/coluniists/237 (May 3, 2004).
90. S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484; see Doe
v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 00-100-M., 2001 WL 873063, *4 (D.N.H. July 19,
2001).
91. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
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which can be used to identify a computer or user on the Internet, the
internal IP address is session-specific information, useful primarily
for purposes of routing requested information to the correct computer
while the computer is connected to the network. Gateway
information, DNS information, and other information transmitted to a
computer in connection with roaming use likewise provide
information that facilitates the routing of information, but is not
designed to allow connections to a network from the Internet. This
information could, however, be useful to a hacker because it would
provide some information about the internal configuration of the
operator's network.
The information obtained by a roaming Wi-Fi user's computer is
used only for purposes of routing information. This information is
invisible to the user unless the user specifically runs a program or
command to view the information for purposes of confirming or
troubleshooting a connection. In most cases, a roaming user could
argue that he or she did not actually "obtain" any information,
because the user did not personally view any of the information used
by the user's computer. In no event does a roaming Wi-Fi user use
information to contact, embarrass, or harass a network operator.
Because the purpose of Section 1030(a)(2)(C) is to protect privacy,
not to protect property, it is clear that mere use of an open connection
is not the type of action that Section 1030(a)(2)(C) is designed to
prevent.
f Damage and Loss
The Section 1030(a)(5) provisions discussed in this article
require both that the unauthorized access cause "damage" and that the
conduct causes "loss" aggregating at least $5,000 in value. Likewise,
in order to maintain a civil claim under Section 1030(a)(2), a plaintiff
must also show a loss exceeding this threshold.92 It is possible that a
user who transmitted large amounts of data through an open Wi-Fi
network could cause damage as defined by the statute. It is also
theoretically possible that a network operator who had unintentionally
left a network open could incur losses exceeding $5,000 in assessing
whether access had caused the network operator harm, but allowing a
network operator to recover for the expense of securing its network in
this situation would reward the operator's negligence.
92. Register.corn, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 439-40 (2d Cir. 2004).
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The term "damage" means any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information. It is
conceivable, though unlikely, that a roaming Wi-Fi user could cause
"damage" by causing an impairment to the availability of a system, in
the event that the user's actions significantly reduce the amount of
bandwidth available to the network operator. As described in Part
II.B. above, any such "damage" would likely be negligible.
[T]he term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim,
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service ....
The cost of bandwidth used by a roaming Wi-Fi user would
practically never exceed $5,000. It is possible for a network operator
to argue that the costs of securing a network constitute a "loss"
triggered by a roaming user's access to a network. If a network
operator incurred security-related costs after discovering that a
roaming Wi-Fi user had accessed the operator's network, these costs
might properly be classified as costs of responding to an offense and
conducting a damage assessment.
The cost of implementing security measures were included in the
calculation of "loss" in the prosecution of Stefan Puffer, in what
might have been the first Wi-Fi related prosecution under the CFAA.
In that case, Puffer, a former technology consultant to the Harris
County, Texas District Clerk's office was prosecuted for allegedly
using an open Wi-Fi connection to demonstrate the security risks
presented by the configuration of the computer systems maintained by
the District Clerk's office. Based on Puffer's demonstration to the
District Clerk and to a reporter for the Houston Chronicle, the District
Clerk's office hired security professionals to address these risks.
Puffer was then charged with causing the transmission of codes or
commands in violation of Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), of causing loss
aggregating at least $5,000 under Section 1030(b)(i), and of causing
damage to a computer system used by a government entity in
furtherance of the administration of justice under Section 1030(b)(v)
(a section not discussed in detail above because it relates to specific
circumstances that will not typically be applicable to roaming Wi-Fi
use). 94 The prosecution's theory was that the need for consulting
93. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(l 1) (West Supp. 2004).
94. Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Puffer, (CR H-02-388) (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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services prompted by Puffer's demonstration could be included in the
amount constituting the District Clerk's loss for purposes of the
$5,000 threshold. Puffer was acquitted because the jury found he did
not intentionally cause damage, as required by Section
1030(a)(5)(A)(i).95
U.S. v. Middleton and In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy
Litigation,96 two cases decided prior to an amendment to the CFAA
that defined "loss," suggest that the costs of repairing damage and
resecuring systems can be considered losses under the CFAA, but that
costs of improving a system other than to prevent further damage may
not be included. Incurring $5,000 of loss in preventing roaming users
from accessing a Wi-Fi network seems excessive (except on large or
complicated networks), and more likely to represent the cost of
improvement than repair. A Wi-Fi network may be secured against
access by enabling features included on any access point. At least
one case has refused to find a "loss" when a simple security option
was available. In Doubleclick, the Southern District of New York
held that the "loss" requirement of the CFAA was not met when the
plaintiff did not show any damage to its computer systems or data that
could require economic remedies, and when the accessed computer
systems could easily and at no cost be secured against the type of
intrusion of which the plaintiff complained. 97  While it would
certainly be possible for a network operator to spend $5,000 in
consulting fees to enable security measures on its network, Wi-Fi
networks can typically be secured to prevent roaming users from
accessing the network using features included in standard equipment.
Additionally, an interpretation of the CFAA that would allow a
network operator to sue a roaming Wi-Fi user for the cost of securing
the operator's network seems unfair. Given widespread public
warnings from a variety of sources urging Wi-Fi network operators to
secure their networks, as well as warnings published in the instruction
manuals and elsewhere for most access points, a network operator
who wishes to prevent access but does not enable security should be
considered negligent. It is unreasonable to hold a roaming user
responsible for a network operator's negligence, and to thereby
reward such negligence.
95. See John Leyden, Ethical wireless hacker is innocent, The Register, at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/O2/24/ethical-wireless-hacker-is-innocent/ (Feb. 24, 2003).
96. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000); In re DoubleClick
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
97. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25.
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g. The CFAA Is Unlikely to Apply to Roaming Wi-Fi
Use
The generally-applicable provisions of the CFAA discussed in
this article require that a user intentionally access a network without
authorization, and that the user either obtain information or cause
damage and a loss aggregating $5,000. Although it is possible that
the CFAA could be applied to roaming Wi-Fi use, application of the
"obtaining information" provisions of the statute would be
inconsistent with the intent of the statute, and application of the
"damage and loss" portions would reward a network operator's
failure to implement security measures reflecting its expectations
regarding access to its network.
A roaming Wi-Fi user engages in intentional access, but likely
does not intend to engage in unauthorized access. An open network
typically provides no indication to a user that access is unauthorized.
It is reasonable for a user to assume that access to an open network is
not prohibited.
Whether access to an open network is considered unauthorized
under the CFAA is unclear, as courts have applied a variety of tests.
Under the express authorization test, roaming Wi-Fi use would be
unauthorized unless specifically authorized by a network operator.
The subjective expectations test would rely on a network operator's
intent in determining whether access is unauthorized. The reasonable
expectations test applicable to authorization should recognize that an
open network cannot reasonably support an expectation of security or
a finding that access was unauthorized under the CFAA. The express
prohibition test would deem access unauthorized only if a network
operator has indicated that access is prohibited, through
implementation of security measures or otherwise.
The language of Section 1030(A)(2) is broad enough to suggest
that, by accessing routing and addressing information, a roaming Wi-
Fi user "obtains information" for purposes of the statute. However,
the legislative history of this section makes clear that the statute is
intended to protect privacy. Accessing routing and addressing
information as part of roaming use of the Internet through an open
Wi-Fi connection does not provide a threat to a network operator's
privacy. In fact, because a user never actually has to view the
information necessary to use an Internet connection, a roaming user
could argue that he or she did not actually obtain information.
Bandwidth-intensive roaming use of a network could
theoretically cause "damage" under the CFAA by reducing the
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amount of bandwidth available to the network operator. Although it
is possible that roaming Wi-Fi use could prompt a network operator
to incur consulting costs to enable security, and such costs could
reach $5,000, this result would essentially allow a negligent operator
to improve its network at a roaming user's expense. This would be an
unjust result, and should be rejected by any court considering this
situation.
It is unlikely that a roaming user will have the requisite intent to
implicate the CFAA. Although a user could be considered to obtain
information under the CFAA, this reading would be inconsistent with
the intent of the statute. Finally, the damage and loss requirements
under Section 1030(a)(5) would only be met under extreme
circumstances. For these reasons, it is unlikely, though possible, that
the CFAA will apply to roaming Wi-Fi use.
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 98 part of
the Federal Wiretap Act, is intended to protect against the
unauthorized interception of electronic communications, and to
protect stored electronic communications and transactional records
from unauthorized access. 99 While the ECPA could potentially apply
to whackers and other Wi-Fi users, it is clear that the ECPA does not
apply to roaming Wi-Fi users who access the Internet through open
Wi-Fi connections. In the context of electronic radio
communications, the ECPA applies only to the intentional
interception of encrypted content.
Title I of the ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act to prohibit
the intentional interception of the contents of any electronic
communication (specifically including any radio communication). As
amended, the Federal Wiretap Act is a difficult statute that one
appeals court has called "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity."100  Title II of the ECPA prohibits unauthorized access to
stored electronic communications or transactional records. Title III of
the ECPA provides certain requirements for the installation and use of
pen registers and trap and trace devices (discussed below).
Three key elements of the ECPA are relevant in showing that the
ECPA does not apply to roaming Wi-Fi users-intent, encryption,
98. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2000).
99. S. REP. No. 99-54 1, at 1, 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
100. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994).
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and content. A user must intentionally intercept encrypted content of
a communication in order to violate the ECPA. These three elements
will be discussed below.
a. Intent of User
The ECPA protects communications only from intentional
access or interception. The legislative history of the ECPA shows
that the intentional (as opposed to "willful") state of mind
requirement was implemented specifically to address the concern of
radio operators who use radio scanners to receive public
communications, who could inadvertently tune through a private
communication in the course of scanning through frequencies.10' The
"intentional" requirement was specifically implemented by the ECPA
to clarify that inadvertent interceptions are not covered by the
ECPA. 10 2 While an accidental user may "willfully" take actions, such
as enabling a "zero configuration" option on a laptop, that result in a
network connection, an accidental user does not intend to access the
network. Courts have further clarified the intent requirement to
require that the user act purposefully, and that the interception be the
product of the user's conscious objective, rather than a product of
mistake or accident.10 3 The intent requirement elucidates that a user
does not violate the ECPA by accidentally connecting to a network,
but case law suggests that the intent requirement may be met if a user
continues a connection after realizing that an inadvertent connection
has been made.' 04 An accidental user may therefore become a
joyrider if he checks his e-mail after realizing that he has accidentally
connected to the wrong network.
b. Encryption
The ECPA protects communications on a Wi-Fi network only
when the network operator has enabled or implemented a method of
encrypting data transmissions. As discussed in more detail below,
this encryption requirement is a result of the application of the ECPA
to the actions of law enforcement officials. For purposes of this
article, we focus on roaming Wi-Fi users that use only open, or
unencrypted networks.
101. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3560.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1993).
104. Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 1999), rev'd in part, appeal
dismissed in part, 211 F.3d 1210 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
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The ECPA, as part of the Federal Wiretap Act, is intended to
define the circumstances under which a law enforcement agent must
obtain a search warrant before intercepting or accessing a
communication. This Act provides statutory protection in accordance
with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures. Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
protect communications where a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists.l0 5 Underlying the ECPA, therefore, is a form of the reasonable
expectations test that looks at the reasonable expectations of a
network operator with respect to the privacy and protection of its
information.
Congress has attempted to provide some "bright line" tests for
when an expectation of privacy is not reasonable within the context of
the ECPA. The ECPA therefore expressly does not apply to
communications made through an electronic communication system
that is configured to be "readily accessible to the general public.,
106
Under the ECPA, an electronic communication made through a radio
system is "readily accessible to the general public" if it falls into one
of a number of categories, including communications that are not
"scrambled or encrypted" and are not "transmitted using modulation
techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the
public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such
communication."' 0 7 This exception to the ECPA removes all Wi-Fi
networks that do not use encryption from the ECPA's protection. In
light of the ECPA's clarification that use of an unencrypted radio
network does not support a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is
more appropriate to classify the ECPA as a statute that applies the
express prohibition test than the reasonable expectations test.
c. Content
The ECPA prohibits interception and access of the "contents" of
a communication, 10 8 which is defined as "any information concerning
the substance, purport or meaning of that communication."' 0 9 A
whacker may intercept "content," but joyriders, war-drivers, and
105. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 25i1 (g)(i) (2000).
107. Id. § 2510(16).
108. Id. § 2510(4).
109. Id. § 2510(8).
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accidental users interact only with administrative components of a
network.
The ECPA has a counterpart statute, Chapter 206 of Title 18,' '0
that governs "pen registers" and "track and trace devices," which are
designed to intercept addressing and transactional information
relating to messages, rather than content. This statute is designed to
allow law enforcement to intercept this "transactional" information
with a court order, rather than requiring a full warrant. The relevant
definitions of "pen register" and "track and trace devices" are as
follows:
(3) the term "pen register" means a device or process which
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a
wire or electronic communication is transmitted...
(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or process
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify
the source of a wire or electronic communication .... "
While a roaming Wi-Fi user's computer may receive and use
certain addressing information in order to establish and maintain a
connection with a network, it is clear that the intent of the pen register
and trap and trace statutes is to regulate how addressing information
can be used in connection with obtaining information about specific
communications. Roaming Wi-Fi users will not collect specific
information about other communications taking place on the network.
d. The ECPA Does Not Apply to Roaming Wi-Fi Use
The ECPA prohibits the intentional interception of the contents
of electronic communications. The ECPA contains an express
exception to its prohibitions for radio communications that are not
encrypted. This exception makes the ECPA inapplicable to roaming
Wi-Fi use, although it may still apply to whacking. In addition,
roaming Wi-Fi use does not involve the interception of the contents of
communications for purposes of the statute. For these reasons, the
ECPA does not apply to roaming Wi-Fi use.
110. 18 U.S.C.S. § 251 1(2)(h)(i) (LexisNexis 2004).
1M1. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3127(3), (4).
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3. Section 633 of the Communications Act
Section 633 of the Communications Act of 1934, titled
"Unauthorized reception of cable services," provides penalties for any
person who willfully receives "any communications service offered
over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable




Although this section appears as though it could be relevant to
roaming use of a Wi-Fi signal for which Internet connectivity is
provided by cable modem, the section has been interpreted to apply
only to the reception of services at the point at which such services
are actually being distributed over the cable system. Section 633,
therefore, does not apply to roaming Wi-Fi use.
Although cable modem providers have asserted that connecting
an open Wi-Fi access point to a cable modem may constitute a
violation of Section 633 of the Communications Act," 3 this statute
likely does not apply to Wi-Fi users who connect to these access
points. The legislative history of Section 633 states that
The [Energy & Commerce] Committee intends the phrase "service
offered over a cable system" to limit the applicability of this
section to theft of a service from the point at which it is actually
being distributed over a cable system. Thus, situations arising with
respect to the reception of services which are transmitted over-the-
air (or through another technology), but which are also distributed
over a cable system, continue to be subject to resolution under
section 605 to the extent reception or interception occurs prior to
or not in connection with, distribution of the service over a cable
system. 114
"Communications Service" is not defined in the
Communications Act, but the legislative history for this section
indicates that the term is intended to mean "any communications
service," including, for example, audio, video, textual, data, or other
service offered over a cable system, including any material
transmitted to or from a subscriber over a cable system that has
interactive capability. This definition would likely be interpreted to
include cable modem service, because cable modem service is a data
service offered over a cable system.
112. 47 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2001).
113. See Letter from Gregory Powell, Abuse & Security, Supervisor, High Speed Online
Services, Time Warner Cable of NYC (June 25, 2002), available at
http://www.serebin.com/ben/wireless/TWC Wireless Response.jpg.
114. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 83 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4720.
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The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and several
courts have found that cable modem service is not "cable service" for
purposes of the Communications Act. l l5 The FCC further stated that
cable modem service is not governed by Title VI of the
Communications Act, which includes Section 633.116 However,
portions of the FCC's ruling that strictly classified cable modem
service as an "information service" rather than a "telecommunications
service" were later overruled by the courts, and in making the
foregoing statement, the FCC was not specifically considering
Section 633. In light of these facts, it is reasonable to assume that
cable modem service may still be considered a "communications
service offered over a cable system."
Courts have cited the legislative history provision excerpted
above for the proposition that Section 633 governs reception of
communications while being transmitted over cable, but that Section
605 of the Communications Act (which provides for more severe
penalties) applies to reception of communications while being
transmitted by radio. The legislative history, as well as the cases
citing it, contemplates the transmission of communications initially
by radio, and subsequently by cable. However, the legislative history
also reflects that Section 633 is not intended to apply to reception
occurring "not in connection with distribution... over a cable
system." Reception of a signal from a Wi-Fi connection is not
reception in connection with distribution over a cable system, even if
such connection's Internet connectivity is provided through a cable
modem system.
Section 633 of the Communications Act prohibits the willful
reception of communications services offered over a cable system.
Cases make clear that Section 633 applies only to information while it
is being transmitted over a cable system. This section, therefore, does
not apply to roaming Wi-Fi use.
4. Section 605 of the Communications Act
The cases discussed above pointed out that Section 605 of the
Communications Act prohibits unauthorized publication or use of
115. Brand X Internet Svcs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003); In the Matter of
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, 4833 (2002).
116. In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable
and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4838 (2002).
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radio communications,11 7 but Section 605 probably does not apply to
roaming Wi-Fi users. Although the language of the statute is very
broad, courts interpreting the statute have imposed a requirement that
communications that implicate this statute must be the subject of a
reasonable expectation of privacy as defined under the ECPA.
Section 605 contains two prohibitions potentially applicable to
roaming Wi-Fi users: (i) it prohibits any person who receives a radio
communication that is not intended for the use of the general public
from publishing the existence of the radio communication; and (ii) it
prohibits a recipient of a radio communication to which such recipient
is not "entitled" from using such communication for his or her own
benefit, or for the benefit of a third-party.
The prohibitions of Section 605 apply "except as authorized by
[the ECPA].""' 8  Federal Appeals Courts have interpreted this
exception to mean that communications that would be subject to both
the ECPA and Section 605 are subject to the same Fourth
Amendment restrictions under each statute.' 9 As discussed above,
the ECPA's application to radio communications is limited by the
Fourth Amendment to communications that are encrypted or are
otherwise "not readily accessible to the general public." At least one
Federal District Court has also found that Section 605 is subject to the
same limitation. 120 Consequently, Section 605 is unlikely to apply to
roaming Wi-Fi use of open networks.
At first glance, it could appear that a war-driver's publication of
a map of access points, including both encrypted and open access
points, could constitute publication of the existence of a radio
communication within the meaning of Section 605. Because war-
driving maps contain information about encrypted communications,
one could argue that they should be considered outside the ECPA's
"readily accessible to the general public" exception. However, the
information collected by a war-driver is typically transmitted in clear
text, even on encrypted networks. Consequently, Section 605 should
not apply to war-driving.
117. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 2001).
118. Id.
119. United States v. Hill, 459 U.S. 828 (1982); Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d
535, 537-40 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 25-27 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. deniedsub nom.
120. United States v. Gass, 936 F. Supp. 810, 811-12 (N.D. Okla. 1996). But see Cal.
Satellite Sys. v. Seimon, 767 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (decided before the enactment in
1986 of the ECPA).
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B. State Laws
1. Statutes Prohibiting Access to or Use of Networks
Most states have statutes that prohibit intentional, unauthorized
access to, or use of, computer networks. These statutes are often
similar to the CFAA, but have certain critical differences. For
example, some of these statutes do not require that a user actually
cause damage. Whether these statutes apply to roaming Wi-Fi use
depends in many cases on whether the user intentionally engaged in
unauthorized access. Unlike the CFAA, some state statutes provide
express requirements as to the unauthorized element of this inquiry,
as well as the intent element. Some states support the express
authorization test or the express prohibition test for determining
authorization. Other state statutes focus on the user's mens rea with
respect to authorization, using either the reasonable expectations test
or other standards to determine whether the user had the requisite
intent.
a. Statutes Supporting Express Authorization Test
Colorado's Computer Crime statute prohibits the knowing and
unauthorized use of any computer network. 12' This statute defines
"authorization" as express consent.' 22 On its face, this statute would
prohibit roaming Wi-Fi use. No reported cases in Colorado indicate
an interpretation to the contrary.
As discussed in Part III.B.5 below, the California Attorney
General's office has taken an aggressive enforcement position with
respect to its unauthorized access and theft statutes. California Penal
Code Section 502123 prohibits users from "knowingly" and "without
permission" accessing or using a network. The Attorney General's
office has indicated that such access would be considered "without
permission" absent express permission. 1
24
b. Statutes Supporting Express Prohibition Test
State statutes supporting the express prohibition test should not
apply to roaming Wi-Fi use. These statutes require that a network
operator take affirmative actions to prohibit access. Roaming Wi-Fi
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(1)(a) (2003).
122. Id. § 18-5.5-101(1).
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2004).
124. Telephone Interview with Robert Morgester, Cal. Deputy Att'y Gen., (June 22,
2004).
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use that involves simply accessing the Internet through an open
network will therefore not violate these statutes.
New York requires as an element of its Unauthorized Use of a
Computer statute that the computer or computer service accessed be
"equipped or programmed with any device or coding system, a
function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of said computer
or computer system. ' 125 Under this statute, roaming access to Wi-Fi
networks would be prohibited only if a network operator has enabled
encryption or other security. New York also has a theft of services
provision that likely does not apply to roaming Wi-Fi use, as
discussed in Part II.B.2 below.
Likewise, the Unauthorized Computer Access provisions of
Nebraska's Computer Crimes Act require that a user penetrate a
computer security system, 126 defined as
a computer program or device that:
(a) Is intended to protect the confidentiality and secrecy of data
and information stored in or accessible through the computer
system; and
(b) Displays a conspicuous warning to a user that the user is
entering a secure system or requires a person seeking access to
knowingly respond by use of an authorized code to the program or
device in order to gain access .... 127
While this provision would not prohibit use of an open Wi-Fi
network, Nebraska's Computer Crimes Act contains two other
provisions that may apply to roaming Wi-Fi users. The first is a
provision prohibiting intentional access with knowledge that such
access was not authorized 128 (discussed in Part II.B.l(c) below), and
the second is a theft of services provision 129 (discussed in Part II.B.2
below).
Illinois,130 Michigan,13 1 and Massachusetts 132 have statutes that
presume that use is unauthorized if the network operator has put
security measures in place. These statutes do not have an equivalent
125. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999).
126. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1343.01 (1995).
127. Id. § 28-1343(5).
128. Id. § 28-1347.
129. [d. § 28-1344.
130. See 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN, 16D-7 (West Supp. 1992).
131. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.797 Sec. 7(6)(c) (West Supp. 2004).
132. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 120F (West 2000).
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presumption that use is authorized if the network operator does not
use security measures. However, these statutes imply that silence
does not indicate a lack of authorization. If silence rendered access
unauthorized, the express presumption that adoption of security
measures renders access unauthorized would be unnecessary. These
states' statutes, therefore, support application of the express
prohibition test to roaming Wi-Fi users.
Many state statutes, as well as the CFAA, prohibit intentional
unauthorized access, but do not clarify what level of mens rea applies
to the unauthorized nature of the user's access. A number of states,
including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, and Nebraska, expressly
require that a user know that access to a Wi-Fi network is
unauthorized in order for computer access or use statutes to apply.'
33
Given the ease with which an open network may be accessed, and
public support for roaming Wi-Fi use, a user will typically only know
that access to the Internet through a Wi-Fi network is unauthorized if
security measures have been enabled on the network. A literal
reading of these statutes would therefore lead to a result similar to that
achieved by the express prohibition test: a user would be deemed to
engage in intentional unauthorized access only if a network operator
had taken affirmative steps to indicate that access was unauthorized.
c. Statutes Supporting Reasonable Expectations Test
As demonstrated in the preceding paragraph, some statutes apply
an express mens rea requirement to the unauthorized nature of a
user's access. Statutes requiring actual knowledge that access is
unauthorized effectively employ the express prohibition test. Other
states look to the reasonable belief of the user, rather than knowledge,
in determining whether computer access or use is unlawful. These
statutes provide good examples of the reasonable expectations test.
The reasonable expectations test should not prohibit roaming use of
Wi-Fi, as widespread custom and public perceptions support a
reasonable belief that an open network may be accessed. However,
courts considering application of these statutes could reach contrary
conclusions. It is, therefore, unclear as to whether statutes applying
the reasonable expectations test will prohibit roaming use of Wi-Fi.
Alabama's Computer Crime Act expressly does not apply when
a defendant has reasonable grounds to believe that he has
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251(b)(1) (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 932
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 357(1) (West 1964 & Supp. 2003); NEB. REv. STAT. §
28-1344 (1995).
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authorization to access a network., 34  Arkansas, 135 Nevada, 3 6 and
Ohio137 add to this defense, that a defendant must either reasonably
believe he or she had authority, or reasonably believe that the network
operator would have authorized the use of the network. Similarly, the
unlawful access or use statutes in Alaska 138 and Missouri 139 prohibit
access when a user does not have any reasonable ground to believe
that such user has the right to access a network. In each of these
cases, a user could presumably defend against prosecution by arguing
that the custom and common practice of network operators making
their networks available to the public free of charge could support a
reasonable belief that a roaming Wi-Fi user's access to a network is or
would be authorized.
It is an affirmative defense to New Hampshire's Computer
Related Offenses statute 40 and to West Virginia's Computer Crime
and Abuse Act' 4 ' to show that a user reasonably may not have known
that his or her access was unauthorized. A Wi-Fi user could typically
argue that he or she could not determine from the information
available with respect to a given open Wi-Fi network, whether access
is intended to be authorized or not. However, this standard seems to
require a higher level of inquiry than a knowledge-based standard. A
sophisticated user could make an educated guess in some
circumstances as to whether a network was likely left open by design
or by mistake.
New Hampshire's legislature was the first to consider directly
addressing the topic of roaming Wi-Fi use. House Bill 495,141 which
was ultimately not passed by the legislature, provided,
The owner of a wireless computer network shall be responsible
for securing such computer network. It shall be an affirmative defense
to a prosecution for unauthorized access to a wireless computer
network if the unauthorized access meets the following requirements:
(1) The person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer or
computer network, or a person empowered to license access thereto,
had authorized him or her to access; or (2) The person reasonably
134. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-102 (2003).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-203(d) (Michie Supp. 2003).
136. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.477 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003).
137. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.03(C) (Anderson 2003).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740(a) (Michie 2002).
139. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
140. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17(1)(c) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
141. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-1 7(a)(1) (Michie 2000).
142. N.H. H.B. 495 (LexisNexis 2003).
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believed that the owner of the computer or computer network, or a
person empowered to license access thereto, would have authorized
the person to access without payment of any consideration; or (3) The
person could not have reasonably known that his or her access was
unauthorized.
43
The New Hampshire bill was introduced by Representative
Richard "Stretch" Kennedy, in response to the threatened prosecution
of one of Rep. Kennedy's constituents. 44  Brian Williams, a
technology professional, was threatened by a municipal official with
prosecution under New Hampshire's "Computer Related Offenses;
Network Security" statute after inadvertently discovering that a local
governmental office operated an open network, and alerting the office
to the security risks presented by the office's network configuration.
House Bill 495 was intended to place the burden of securing a
wireless network on the network owner, and to make clear that
negligent or otherwise inadvertent access to a wireless network would
not violate the statute. The bill was passed by the New Hampshire
House of Representatives, but was abandoned without significant
discussion in the Senate.
In threatening prosecution against Mr. Williams, the municipal
official alleged that Mr. Williams reasonably should have known that
access was unauthorized, given his extensive experience in the
information technology industry and his familiarity with the
municipality and its technical competence. After an exchange of
correspondence with Mr. Williams' attorney, the municipality
ultimately determined not to pursue prosecution of Mr. Williams.
d. No Guidance
More than thirty states have laws that apply when a network is
accessed without authorization or without consent, but do not provide
any additional guidance as to how authorization or consent is to be
interpreted. These statutes create uncertainty among roaming Wi-Fi
users that threatens to deter use of open networks, regardless of
whether the network operator intends to afford access to roaming
users.
143. Id.
144. Telephone Interview with Brian Williams (Mar. 12, 2004).
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2. Theft of Services Statutes
Theft of computer services statutes in some states could
potentially apply to roaming Wi-Fi use. Like other statutes that
prohibit access to computers and networks, many of these statutes
require intentional unauthorized access. Theft of services statutes
present a few issues in addition to those described in the preceding
section. A number of theft of services statutes require that the
services accessed be services that are typically available only for
compensation. Some theft statutes also require that services be
obtained by threat, deception, or fraud.
While unauthorized access statutes typically are intended to
protect networks operated by individuals and businesses, state theft of
services statutes are additionally intended to protect services provided
by cable operators and Internet service providers. Some state theft of
services statutes apply to services that are known to be available only
for compensation,1 45 are available only for compensation, 146 or are
offered on a subscription or other basis for monetary consideration.
47
Many individuals and businesses make Wi-Fi access to the
Internet available free of charge. Many other entities provide pay-
per-use or subscription Wi-Fi access. An entity that offers Internet
access for compensation, whether an individual, coffee shop or other
business, or traditional Internet service provider, generally will
implement a login mechanism to allow the provider to collect its
compensation. A roaming Wi-Fi user of the type discussed in this
article only accesses open networks without security mechanisms or
encryption.
However, a traditional Internet service provider may provide
subscription-based Internet service to a business or individual who
then intentionally or unintentionally makes this Internet service
available to roaming Wi-Fi users over an unencrypted Wi-Fi
connection. A roaming Wi-Fi user may access a compensated
145. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(1) (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1802(A)(6) (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3211 (c) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 514.060 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §357 (West 1964 & Supp. 2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-8 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
146. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. L. § 7-104(e) (applying only if the access is with knowledge
that the services are provided without the consent of the person providing them); OR. REV.
STAT. § 164.125 (2003) (applying only if person accessing has intent to avoid payment, and if
services are obtained by force, threat, deception or other means to avoid payment for the
services).
147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 33A (West 2000) (requiring intent to defraud).
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service, but will have no way to know whether the service provider's
acceptable use policy authorizes sharing of the service.
Most of the statutes cited above require that the compensated
services be obtained by deception, force, threat, or other means,
148
intent to defraud, 149 or intent to avoid payment. 150 Theft of services
statutes in Arizona, the District of Columbia, and Maryland appear to
apply only if the user knows that the ultimate service provider would
not have allowed use of the connection.'
15
Several states, including Nebraska, have statutes that are similar
to unauthorized access statutes, except that they require that the user
intentionally deprives another person of services or obtains "property
or services of another." Nebraska's statute defines "services" to
include, but not be limited to, computer time, data processing, and
storage functions. If Internet connectivity were included within
"services," analysis of the application of this statute, like most
unauthorized access statutes, would likely depend on whether a
roaming Wi-Fi user's access was considered to be "without
authorization." Nebraska provides no further guidance on this point.
A theft of services statute can usually be analyzed in the same
way as other unauthorized use or access statutes. However,
application of theft of services statutes may also depend on whether
Wi-Fi Internet connectivity falls within the services protected by the
statute. In some cases, statutes apply only to services that a user
knows are provided only for compensation, and will generally not
apply with respect to a roaming Wi-Fi user's access to a private
network. Likewise, neither this type of statute nor most unauthorized
access statutes will apply to a roaming user's access to a service
provider's services because the user will not knowingly or
intentionally access the services in violation of the service provider's
terms of service.
3. Statutes Prohibiting Interruption or Degradation of
Services
Several states have statutes prohibiting interruption or
degradation of computer services. Because use of an Internet
148. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(1) (Michie 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.060
(Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 357 (West 1964 & Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:20-8 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.125 (2003).
149. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 33A (West 2000).
150. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(11) (McKinney 1999).
151. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802(A)(6) (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3211(b)
(2001); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. L. § 7-104(e)(2).
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connection could degrade the speed of the connection for other users
of the connection, it is possible that this type of statute could apply to
a roaming Wi-Fi user. In most cases, however, these statutes contain
a requirement that the disruption be intentional.1 52  Connecticut's
statute also prohibits recklessly (rather than intentionally) degrading
service, and could potentially apply to a roaming Wi-Fi user.
153
4. Statutes Prohibiting Interception of Communications
A few states, including Delaware, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah, have enacted statutes prohibiting
interception of communications. 154 These states are similar to the
ECPA, and typically will not apply to roaming Wi-Fi because, like
the ECPA, they are intended to prohibit interception of the content of
messages and because they are expressly inapplicable to
transmissions that are configured to be accessible to the general
public. It is not clear whether courts in these states would adopt the
same "bright line" rule applied by the ECPA, which permits
interception of unencrypted communications.
The interception of communications statutes of Kansas and
Pennsylvania suggest that communications systems that are readily
accessible will be exempt from the statutes only if they are intended
to be readily accessible. These statutes therefore could potentially
apply a version of the subjective expectations test that looks to
whether the operator intentionally or inadvertently failed to enable
security on its network.
5. Statutes Prohibiting Facilitation of Access to Networks
California Penal Code Section 502(c)(6) imposes criminal
penalties on anyone who "[k]nowingly and without permission
provides or assists in providing a means of accessing a computer,
computer system, or computer network. 1 55  California Deputy
Attorney General Robert Morgester posted a warning to at least one
war-driving website that publishes information about the location and
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 934 (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-8 (Michie 2000).
153. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251(d) (West 1994).
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II § 2402 (Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West
1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2514 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:I56A-3 (West 1995 & Supp.
2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (2000); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon 2003
& Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (2003).
155. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(6) (West 2004).
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encryption status of Wi-Fi networks, that publication of such
information violates Section 502(c)(6). 15 6
At the time Mr. Morgester posted this warning, no war-driver
had been prosecuted under Section 502(c)(6). However, it is clear
that a war-driver who posts information about access points
discovered while war-driving may be subject to prosecution in
California. It is not as clear that a court would agree that the statute
applies to war-driving itself.
Enforcement of Section 502 to prohibit posting of access point
information could potentially invoke concerns regarding the war-
drivers' First Amendment rights to free speech. Discussion of
whether application of this statute runs afoul of the Constitution is
beyond the scope of this article.
The draft Model Communications Security Legislation
(commonly known as the "Super-DMCA"), which has been adopted
in several forms in a number of states, also imposes penalties for
selling devices that are designed to allow for unauthorized access to a
service provider's network. 57 However, the Super-DMCA clearly
applies only to services that are offered for compensation.
C. Common Law
The tort of trespass to chattels traditionally provided remedies to
a livestock owner for intentional injury to the owner's sheep or cattle.
This tort has recently been revived as a method of combating spain
and other Internet-related issues. Recent expansion and adaptation of
this tort to electronic "trespasses" make this tort potentially applicable
to some types of network access through Wi-Fi, particularly whacking
activities. However, it is unlikely that roaming Wi-Fi access to the
Internet will meet the intent and damage requirements necessary to
support an action for trespass to chattels.
The common law tort of trespass to chattels provides remedies
"where an intentional interference with the possession of personal
property has proximately caused injury. 158 While tangible contact
was traditionally necessary to support a cause of action for trespass,
courts have recently applied the tort to computer-related activities by
adopting the view that the transmission of electronic signals can meet
156. See Posting of Robert M. Morgester, Cal. Deputy Att'y Gen., at
http://wigle.net/phpbb/viewtopic.php?t=193 (Sept. 12, 2003) (posting of this item was
confirmed in a telephone interview with Robert Morgester (June 22, 2004)).
157. See MODEL COMMUNICATIONS SEC. LEGISLATION (Draft April 11, 2003).
158. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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the tangible contact requirement. 159  Trespass to chattels has
increasingly been applied to behavior on the Internet, including the
use of website "robots"'' 60 and the transmission of unsolicited
commercial e-mail (spam). 161 Using the logic of these recent cases, a
network operator could argue that a roaming Wi-Fi user's use of
bandwidth constituted an interference with the operator's network.
Recent decisions applying trespass to chattels to electronic
communications have required that the plaintiff establish: (i) that the
defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered with the
plaintiff's interest in the computer system; and (ii) defendant's
unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to the plaintiff.1
62
These requirements, relating to intent, authorization, and damages,
mirror requirements found in many of the statutory sections discussed
above. Although this section will show that a trespass to chattels
action based on a roaming user's activities is unlikely to succeed, the
analysis applied by courts to the various elements of a trespass to
chattels claim provide a helpful context in considering the application
of the CFAA and state statutes to roaming Wi-Fi use.
1. Intentional Use
A New York court has clarified that "intentional" use requires
action "with the intention of interfering with the property or with
knowledge that such interference is substantially certain to result."
'1 63
Part III.C.3 below explains that a roaming Wi-Fi user's activities are
unlikely to represent the type of interference required to support a
trespass to chattels action unless the user consumes a great deal of
bandwidth. Even with sustained high-bandwidth usage of an open
network, a trespass to chattels claim will not succeed unless the user
intended to interfere with the operator's use of bandwidth, or knew
that his or her usage was substantially certain to cause interference.
At least one court has also considered the specific mens rea
required with respect to the unauthorized nature of a user's access. In
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., an Internet service
provider brought a trespass to chattels claim in order to stop
spamming activities. The District Court for the Southern District of
159. Id.
160. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
161. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-21 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
162. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.
163. Sch. of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
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Ohio stated, "To prove that a would-be trespasser acted with the
intent required to support liability in tort it is crucial that defendant be
placed on notice that he is trespassing."' 164 This statement makes
express the implicit scienter requirement discussed above with respect
to the CFAA. This statement also provides a good example of an
application of the express prohibition test for determining when
access is unauthorized.
Both the requirement that a user intentionally cause interference
and the requirement that a user be notified that access is unauthorized
make it unlikely that a trespass to chattels action would be successful
against a roaming Wi-Fi user.
2. Unauthorized Use
Courts have framed the "unauthorized" requirement for a
trespass to chattels action in a variety of ways. For instance, the
Restatement (Second) of Tort, does not require that a trespasser be
unauthorized, but instead provides privileges, which would defeat a
trespass to chattels claim, to users who have obtained consent, or who
reasonably use the facilities of a public utility.
165
In CompuServe, the Southern District of Ohio considered both
the consent privilege and the public utility privilege with respect to
the activities of Cyber Promotions. The court dismissed the argument
that an Internet Service Provider could be considered a public utility
for purposes of the privilege. The court acknowledged, however, that
CompuServe may have provided "a tacit invitation for anyone on the
Internet" to use its computers for the purposes of forwarding e-mail,
but that any consent CompuServe may have given was revoked when
CompuServe expressly notified Cyber Promotions that its spamming
activities were not authorized.1
66
Trespass to chattels had been an infrequently-used tort until "a
few courts ... breathed new life into the common law cause of action
for trespass to chattels by finding it viable online,' 67 in CompuServe,
eBay, Inc. v. Bidders' Edge, Inc., and Intel Corp. v. Hamidi. In
virtually all of the prominent recent Internet-related trespass to
chattels cases, courts have examined website terms of use or other
statements by the network or computer owner indicating to users that
the type of disruptive access involved in the cases was not
164. CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
165. See generally, R.2d Torts §§ 217 et seq. (Lexis 2004).
166. Id. at 1023.
167. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 436 (2d Cir. 2004).
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authorized. 168 These cases provide examples of application of the
express prohibition test.
3. Damages
Traditionally, trespass to chattels claims have required a showing
that interference with an interest in property must have caused actual
damage to the property or deprived the owner of its use for a
substantial period. 169 In eBay v. Bidder's Edge, Bidder's Edge used
Internet "spiders," which consumed a portion of eBay's bandwidth
and server capacity by sending 80,000 to 100,000 requests to eBay's
computers systems per day. eBay had unsuccessfully tried many
different business and technical methods of preventing Bidder's Edge
from accessing its website. In granting equitable relief to eBay, the
Northern District of California, held that "even if, as [Bidder's Edge]
argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay's computer
system capacity, [Bidder's Edge] has nonetheless deprived eBay of
the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own
purposes."' 70 The court further held that failing to provide a legal
remedy to prevent Bidder's Edge from using spiders could encourage
others to engage in the same types of activities. 171 Some interpreted
this decision as eliminating the requirement that actual damage or
deprivation of use for a substantial period of time be shown. 1
72
However, the California Supreme Court, in the 2003 case Intel,
interpreted the eBay decision to have retained the requirement that
damage or substantial deprivation of use be shown, but to have
provided that this requirement may be met in circumstances where
many entities may engage in the same behavior and, in the aggregate,
cause the functionality of the owner's system to be impaired. The
California Supreme Court held that temporary use of a portion of
computer processors was not sufficient to support a claim for trespass.
The court went on to state that "an actionable deprivation of use must
be for a time so substantial that it is possible to estimate the loss
caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use
is not sufficient unless there is a dispossession .... 17 The Intel
168. Id. at 402; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (Ist Cir. 2003);
eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
169. See Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 S.W.2d 198, 201 (1981).
170. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1058.
173. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306 (2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 219 cmt i (1965)).
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court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that
a property owner is protected against lesser forms of interference by
the owner's legal privilege to use reasonable force to protect the
property.
Roaming Wi-Fi use will not typically deprive a network operator
of bandwidth for a substantial or even noticeable period of time,
unless the user were to engage in substantial downloading of media
files, uploading of spam, or other high-bandwidth activities. Nor is
there a substantial risk that permitting one roaming Wi-Fi user to use
an open connection could encourage others to do the same. A
network operator displeased by the use of his or her open network by
a roaming user could simply enable encryption or some other form of
security on the network, blocking future access by all roaming users.
Other courts, considering spamming activities, have recognized that,
in trespass to chattels actions, "the implementation of technological
means of self-help, to the extent that reasonable measures are
effective, is particularly appropriate in this type of situation and
should be exhausted before legal action is proper.
174
D. Common Law Trespass is Unlikely to Apply to Roaming
Wi-Fi Use
To support a trespass to chattels claim, a network operator would
have to show that a roaming user intentionally and without
authorization interfered with the operator's interest in its network, and
that this unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to the
operator.
The intent component of this cause of action requires that a
roaming user knew or was reckless as to whether his or her access
would cause a disruption of the operator's service. Unless a roaming
user consumes a great deal of bandwidth, he or she is unlikely to
expect that his or her usage could cause a disruption or other damage.
The intent component has also been interpreted to require that a
user be notified that access is prohibited. Practically speaking, only
by enabling security measures will a network operator provide notice
to a user that access is prohibited. On an open network, a user will
not have notice that access is prohibited.
Most courts considering whether access to a website is
unauthorized for purposes of a trespass to chattels claim have applied
the express prohibition test, by relying on the terms of use posted by a
174. CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
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network operator to determine whether access is authorized. It is not
clear that a court would use this test with respect to a roaming Wi-Fi
user, because a Wi-Fi network may in some cases have more of a
private character than a website.
Although courts have found that a network operator can suffer
damage for purposes of a trespass to chattels claim, even without
proof of a quantifiable diminution in bandwidth, other courts have re-
iterated that a substantial interference with an operator's interest in its
network is necessary to support a claim. Roaming use of Wi-Fi is
unlikely to cause this type of damage. This type of damage could also
easily be prevented by self-help measures.
A network operator is unlikely to be able to support a trespass to
chattels claim because the operator will typically not be able to show
that a user possessed the requisite intent, or that a user caused the
requisite damages.
IV. PERMITTING ROAMING USE OF WI-FI UNDER EXISTING LAW
The value of roaming Wi-Fi use is threatened by ambiguity and
inconsistency in existing law. Much of this ambiguity and
inconsistency results from application of the concept of intentional,
unauthorized access to opportunistic methods of network access such
as Wi-Fi. Roaming use of Wi-Fi to access the Internet does not
clearly fit into the legal models used to analyze traditional network
access and access to websites. This section analyzes four tests that
can be used to determine whether access is intentional, unauthorized
access, and concludes that the most efficient test is one that requires a
network operator to take action reflecting a prohibition on roaming
access in order for such access to be considered "unauthorized." This
section further recommends statutory models and case law precedent
that can be used in implementing the express prohibition test.
A. Summary of Tests for Finding Intentional Unauthorized
Access
The express authorization test, implicitly suggested by Congress
in enacting the CFAA and embodied in Colorado's Computer Crime
statute, treats all access to open Wi-Fi networks as unauthorized
unless a network operator expressly indicates that access is
authorized. This approach discourages usage of intentionally shared
networks, as many of these networks do not have readily visible
means of indicating that access is authorized, other than that the
network is left open. Typically, there are only a few ways in which a
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user may be affirmatively notified that a network operator intends to
provide access. A network operator may provide signage in a facility,
or may list his or her network in a publicly accessible directory. An
operator may also provide an electronic login or sign-up screen to
expressly indicate that access is shared, but a user must actually
connect to an open network and launch his or her web browsing
software in order to see this screen. This test should be rejected by
courts and legislatures as outdated and a barrier to progress.
The subjective expectations test, implicitly suggested by the
Second Circuit in Morris (and possibly applied in some state
interception of communications statutes), would prohibit access to a
network if the network's operator intended for the network to be
private. A user would be forced to guess at a network operator's
intentions, and could be criminally liable if he or she guessed wrong.
This approach provides no guidance to a user as to whether access is
unauthorized, and would likely discourage roaming use of Wi-Fi
because it creates uncertainty. This test should likewise be rejected.
The reasonable expectations test, applied by the District Court in
EF Cultural Travel, and echoing the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, would prohibit access if
the network operator subjectively intended for its network to be
private, provided that the operator's expectations as to access are
reasonable. While this approach does not provide certainty to a user,
a user could make a strong argument that an operator cannot
reasonably expect that an open network will be treated as private.
The court in EF Cultural Travel rejected the reasonable
expectations test as "a highly imprecise, litigation-spawning
standard."'' 75 However, the court in EF Cultural Travel allowed that
the test could be proper in certain contexts, citing a case applying the
Fourth Amendment standard. Under the ECPA, and by extension,
Section 605 of the Communications Act, the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard has been clarified and
codified. Unencrypted radio communications are not protected under
the ECPA, because a network operator is statutorily deemed to not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these communications.
The ECPA's version of the reasonable expectations test is essentially
equivalent to the express prohibition test, and provides clarity and
facilitates the roaming use of Wi-Fi.
175. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1 st Cir. 2003).
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Many state laws implement a different version of the reasonable
expectations test that looks to the expectation of a user as to whether
access is authorized. This test makes express the scienter requirement
implied, but not clarified, under the CFAA. An analysis of these state
statutes reveals the type of weaknesses and ambiguity that caused the
EF Cultural Travel court to reject the reasonable expectations test.
The ease of accessing an open Wi-Fi network and media statements in
favor of allowing roaming Wi-Fi use would support a reasonable
expectation that accessing open networks is permissible. However,
media statements and public perceptions could easily support an
opposite conclusion as well-hence the controversy addressed by this
article. To borrow language used by the EF Cultural Travel court,
there is currently no "common understanding underpinning" the
expectations of operators and roaming users, partially because the law
is unsettled. While the reasonable expectations test (as applied to a
roaming user's mens rea) should ideally be rejected for these reasons,
this test has already been codified in a number of states, and is
unlikely to change quickly. The responsibility for determining
whether a user's expectations as to accessing open networks are
reasonable will be borne by courts.
The express prohibition test, applied by the First Circuit in EF
Cultural Travel, the Southern District of Ohio in CompuServe, and by
New York's Unauthorized Use of a Computer statute, would deem
access unauthorized, and a user's access to such network intentional,
only if the network operator enabled security or otherwise indicated
that its network was not to be accessed by roaming users. Under this
approach, access to an open Wi-Fi network for purposes of using an
Internet connection would not be considered intentional unauthorized
use.
B. Advantages of Express Prohibition Test
The express prohibition test contains a number of clear
advantages over the other tests discussed in this article. This test
provides clarity to users and promotes roaming Wi-Fi use, encourages
responsible security practices, and provides a bright line for
enforcement of restrictions on access to Wi-Fi networks.
Unlike the subjective expectations test and the reasonable
expectations test, the express prohibition test would allow a Wi-Fi
user to determine quickly whether access to a network was
unauthorized. Adoption of this test would dispel the chilling effect
currently created by ambiguity as to what constitutes legally
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unauthorized usage of a Wi-Fi network. A reduction of this chilling
effect would promote the use of roaming Wi-Fi, and could support an
important step in the expansion of the Internet and the growth of new
networking technologies.
The express prohibition test also provides clarity in the law that
would encourage the adoption of appropriate security measures by
network operators. Clarifying that a network is not protected from
access unless access is expressly discouraged would prompt network
operators to be responsible in their approach to security. Once an
indication that access is prohibited has been shown, the law would
protect the operator's network from undesired access.
Finally, the express prohibition test would provide advantages in
enforcing laws prohibiting unauthorized access. A user who accessed
a secured network or secured portions of the network would be
presumed to have intentionally accessed the network or secured
portion without authorization. Use of the software tools necessary to
defeat WEP or other security means would also assist law
enforcement officials and prosecutors in proving a violation of the
statute.
C. Implementing the Express Prohibition Test
Legislators and courts can improve existing law by consistently
implementing the express prohibition test. Legislators should
consider amending existing statutes applicable to Wi-Fi access to
apply only if security measures have been implemented. Courts
interpreting unauthorized access statutes that do not provide guidance
on how to interpret intentional unauthorized access should consider
precedent implementing the express prohibition test. With respect to
statutes that require the application of the reasonable expectations
test, courts should consider the context in which roaming Wi-Fi use
occurs in determining whether a user's access should be considered
unauthorized.
The New York unauthorized access to computers statute
provides a model statute for legislators. This statute does not apply
unless security measures have been taken. Requiring security
measures as a condition to application of the statute is straightforward
and provides a bright-line test for what access is prohibited.
This article has identified several other statutory approaches to
the express prohibition test. Some states provide an affirmative
defense to a charge of unauthorized access if a user did not know that
access was unauthorized. As stated above, a user will typically know
2004]
160 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.[.
that access was unauthorized only if security has been enabled.
However, this implementation of the express prohibition test could be
watered down to a test resembling the reasonable expectations test, if
a court were to find a user had constructive knowledge that access
was unauthorized.
Statutes have also implemented the express prohibition test as a
presumption that access is not authorized if security measures have
been implemented. Logically, the reverse presumption, that access is
not unauthorized if security measures have not been implemented,
should be true as well. However, because this presumption is not
explicit in these statutes, the statutes remain a bit ambiguous.
Because it is not realistic to expect widespread amendment of
statutes to implement the express prohibition test, judicial approaches
to implementing this test are also important. EF Cultural Travel
provides precedent for a finding that access to a network should not
be considered unauthorized absent an indication to that effect by the
network operator. CompuServe could be viewed as precedent for
finding that a user did not have the intent required to support a finding
of intentional, unauthorized access unless the user had been expressly
or implicitly notified that his or her access was not authorized. While
CompuServe interpreted the common law tort of trespass to chattels,
Theofel v. Farey-Jones 76 indicates that courts may look to common
law trespass cases in interpreting the CFAA and other federal statutes.
Some state statutes have implemented the reasonable
expectations test that looks to a user's reasonable expectations in
determining whether a user intentionally accessed a network without
authorization. Courts should consider the context in which roaming
Wi-Fi takes place in determining whether a user reasonably knew or
should have known that access was unauthorized. Open networks are
easy to access, and are, in fact, commonly shared with the public.
General public perception and the media's treatment of roaming Wi-
Fi could support a reasonable belief that access to an open network is
permissible. Conversely, public warnings about the accessibility of
open networks would not support a network operator's reasonable
belief that an open network is secure. Finally, a court should consider
the value of roaming Wi-Fi to society and to its users, in light of the
low cost of this practice to network operators, in determining whether
an open network user's expectations as to permissibility of access are
reasonable.
176. 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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V. CONCLUSION
Roaming use of Wi-Fi provides a valuable direction for growth
and development of the Internet. Expansion of the area from which
the Internet may be accessed by increasing the footprint of nationwide
Wi-Fi network accessibility has the potential to contribute greatly to
the expansion of current and future networking technologies.
Negative aspects of roaming Wi-Fi use, including aspects associated
with the use of networks that are unintentionally shared, are minimal
and easily mitigated. Because of this value and the minimal
associated risk, the law should encourage the roaming use of Wi-Fi.
Current federal and state laws may apply to the use of Wi-Fi
networks for whacking activities, and to roaming use of open Wi-Fi
networks for purposes of accessing the Internet, and, at least in
California, to war-driving. Many statutes are unclear as to whether
roaming Wi-Fi use is illegal. In a number of states, and potentially
under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, application of
computer access statutes depends on whether a user intentionally
accesses a Wi-Fi network without authorization. Statutory and case
law defining intentional access without authorization is inconsistent
and ambiguous. A lack of clarity and consistency among existing
laws threatens to have a chilling effect on this important direction of
future growth for the Internet.
Legislators and courts should consider that the sharing of
Internet connections using Wi-Fi is a common and widespread
practice. It is often difficult or impossible for a user to determine
whether a connection has been shared intentionally or inadvertently.
In contrast, it is typically easy for a network operator to enable basic
security measures on a Wi-Fi network. The substantial benefits to
society of roaming Wi-Fi use are higher than the minimal costs
associated with access to an inadvertently open network.
Roaming use of Wi-Fi would be facilitated if legislators and
courts were to implement an express prohibitions test, which would
prohibit access to a Wi-Fi network for purposes of accessing the
Internet only if a network operator has enabled security on his or her
network. New York provides a model statute using this approach.
Courts may also look to precedent under the CFAA and cases
interpreting the common law of trespass to chattels in implementing
this approach. Courts may be restricted from implementing this
approach by existing statutes that prescribe the use of a test that looks
to a user's reasonable expectations regarding whether access is
authorized. In these cases, courts should consider that the context in
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which roaming Wi-Fi use occurs would support a user's reasonable
belief that access to an open network is not considered unauthorized.
The rapid rise and evolution of networking technologies
continues to have a profound impact on the assumptions underlying
many aspects of law. Like the Internet, whacking, joyriding, and war-
driving challenge legislators and courts to find solutions that protect a
property owner's rights while encouraging the free flow of
information. By prohibiting use of a Wi-Fi network only when the
network operator has implemented security measures, courts and
legislators will encourage the development and use of this valuable
technology. Simultaneously, this approach will promote sensible
security practices, and protect network operators who have indicated
their access preferences. To summarize-in terms that may have
made the title of this article appear almost nonsensical-the law must
condemn whacking, while recognizing the value in joyriding and war-
driving.
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